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TURNING A SHORT-TERM FLING INTO A LONG-TERM
COMMITMENT: BOARD DUTIES IN A NEW ERA
Nadelle Grossman*
Corporate boards face significant pressure to make decisions that maximize profits
in the short run. That pressure comes in part from executives who are financially
rewarded for short-term profits despite the long-term risks associated with those
profit-making activities. The current financial crisis, where executives at AIG and
numerous other institutions ignored the long-term risks associated with their mort-
gage-backed securities investments, arose largely because those executives were
compensated for the short-term profits generated by those investments despite their
longer-term risks. Pressure on boards for short-term profits also comes from activist
investors who seek to make quick money off of trading in stocks whose prices overly
reflect short-term firm values.
Yet this excessive focus on producing short-term profits runs counter to the interests
of non-short-termist investors, other corporate constituents, as well as our economy
and society as a whole in creating corporate enterprises that are profitable on an
enduring basis. Once again, the current financial crisis provides a lens through
which we can see the distressing impact-both to individual businesses as well as
to the entire US community-of an excessive focus on short-term profits.
I propose a solution to address this problem of short-termism. Under my proposal,
directors would be required to make decisions that are in the long-term best interest
of stockholders and the corporation under their fiduciary duties. I explain in the
Article why I propose fixing the short-termism problem through fiduciary duties as
well as how, practically, my proposal would be implemented.
INTRODUCTION
There is significant pressure on boards of directors, both from
executives as well as from investors, to oversee businesses that gen-
erate profits in the short-term. That often leads to board decisions
directed at producing profits over a short period of time, such as
six months or a year, without regard to the ill effects of those
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decisions on the longer-term health of the business. This tendency
to manage for the short-term, or "short-termism," in large part ex-
plains the near collapse of institutions like AIG and Merrill Lynch
that seemed almost impregnable not long ago, as these institutions
failed to address the long-term risks associated with their mortgage-
related investments.'
The pressure from executives on boards is widely believed to be
due in large part to executive compensation arrangements that
reward executives for short-term profits. Yet executive compensa-
tion arrangements alone may not explain excessive short-termism
by boards. Rather, board short-termism also seems to be due to
some investors with short investment horizons who use activism to
influence boards to make decisions that yield short-term returns
despite the longer-term impairing effects those decisions might
have on the corporate enterprise.
Yet even with these pressures on boards to create short-term
value, a director is supposed to have an unyielding fiduciary duty
to act in the best interest of the entire corporate enterprise of
which she is a director.! This is reflected in the fiduciary duties
every director owes to that corporation and its stockholders.3
Thus we must ask-are directors, by furthering the short-term
interests of investors and executives, meeting their fiduciary duties?
Or do-or more importantly, should-fiduciary duties require that
they oversee a corporation's affairs with a view to furthering the
corporation's sustained success? These are the positive and norma-
tive questions I address in this Article.4
While some scholars have focused on the problem of short-
termism in the modern corporation, many have focused on the
market for corporate control as the primary source for board
short-termism.5 But the wave of investor activism that has emerged
over the past decade has shown that investors are able to influence
1. See discussion infra Part II, discussing the role of short-termism in the recent eco-
nomic crisis.
2. See discussion infra Part III.
3. See discussion infra Part III.
4. While this Article focuses on the fiduciary duties of directors, the principles are
also applicable to executive officers, who also have fiduciary duties to the same constituen-
cies as directors. See Gander v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708 (Del. 2009) (holding that
.corporate officers owe fiduciary duties that are identical to those owed by corporate direc-
tors").
5. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Govern-
ance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Cni. L. REv. 187, 225 (1991) (identifying, as
the essence of the proposal, "to convert every fifth annual meeting of stockholders into a
meaningful referendum on essential questions of corporate strategy and control, and to
limit severely the ability of stockholders to effect changes in control between quinquennial
meetings").
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boards outside of the takeover context, and even outside of the
stockholder voting franchise. It has also recently become apparent
that boards have been perpetuating this short-term corporate vi-
sion by rewarding executives for generating short-term profits
without regard to the ill effects the efforts that created those profits
have on the long-term. This, in turn, has created an additional
source of pressure on boards to manage for the short-term. Be-
cause of these developments and the insights gained from them,
this Article proposes a mechanism to keep directors more focused
on long-term profitability outside of the takeover context, without
requiring significant changes to the current scheme of fiduciary
duties or necessitating the adoption of other significant new laws.'
This Article also uniquely explains how this duty of directors-to
generate long-term profits outside of the takeover context-is in
the interests of both shareholders and non-shareholder constitu-
ents. While communitarian scholars have for some time advocated
for boards' consideration of non-shareholder interests in making
business decisions, they have tended to alienate shareholder pri-
macist scholars, who believe that the corporation should be
managed for the primary benefit of stockholders. This Article
bridges the gap between these two groups of scholars by explaining
how directors' discharge of their reformulated fiduciary duty in the
non-takeover context will be in the interest of shareholders and
other corporate constituents alike..
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows:
Part I reviews the sources of short-termism. The discussion in-
cludes an analysis of how activist investors, particularly hedge
funds, influence board decisions, exacerbating the board's focus
on the short-term. It also examines executive compensation as a
source of pressure on boards to manage for the short-term.
Part II reveals why short-termism is bad, not just for individual
businesses, but also for the health of our economy and society. This
discussion looks at the economic and social costs of short-termism
6. My proposal would complement the proposal recently made by Professors Iman
Anabtawi and Lynn Stout. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Share-
holders, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1255 (2008). Under their proposal, every activist investor who has a
material, pecuniary interest in any matter over which it successfully influences company
action (regardless of its stock ownership percentage) would have fiduciary duties to other
investors similar to those currently imposed on controlling stockholders. See id. at 1295.
However, as they admit, Professors Anabtawi's and Stout's proposal might not be as usefully
applied to address the conflict between investors in their investment horizons. See id. at
1290, 1301. My proposal would address this conflict by imposing on the board the duty to
manage the corporation for the benefit of long-term stockholders and other corporate con-
stituents, even where short-term activist investors attempted to influence those decisions.
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through the lens of the recent financial crisis, tracing the roots of
that crisis to short-termism.
Part III then examines what it means under current law for di-
rectors to act "in the best interest of the corporation and its
stockholders" under directors' fiduciary duties. The discussion re-
veals that directors have discretion to decide over what time period
to look in determining what amounts to the best interest of the
corporation and its stockholders. As I argue in this section, this
grant of broad discretion leaves directors susceptible to influence
by executives and activist investors for decisions that benefit those
constituents' short-term interests, even where that impairs the cor-
poration's ability to generate profits on a sustainable basis.
Part IV examines whether it would in fact be in stockholders'
and non-stockholder constituents' best interests for a corporation
to be managed for the long-term, where the board is not faced with
a takeover decision. As that discussion shows, each of these groups
would in fact benefit from a corporation being managed with the
objective of sustainable profitability.
My proposal, discussed in Part V, would impose on directors the
duty to act in the long-term best interest of the corporation and its
shareholders where the board is not faced with a takeover pro-
posal. While some Delaware courts have expressed a preference for
this type of long-term standard, they have generally not required it.
Instead they have deferred to the board to set the time period for
realization of corporate profitability. My proposal would attempt to
eliminate the link between short-termism and board decisions by
eliminating boards' discretion to make decisions aimed solely or
even primarily at generating profits in the short-term. To comply
with this reformulated duty, boards would need to consider how
the relevant action would impact the corporate enterprise in the
long-term and only pursue actions that were primarily aimed at
generating that long-term benefit. This should also lead to deci-
sions that are in the interests of both the corporation and its
shareholders based on Part IV's revelation that those interests are
aligned in the long-term.
Part VI then concludes.
I. SOURCES OF CORPORATE SHORT-TERMISM
This section traces the sources of short-termism in the modern
public corporation. It begins in Part A by assessing the sources of
investor short-termism. As Subsection 1 explains, the root of inves-
tor short-termism is the rise of the public corporation and the
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creation of the stock market, which encourages speculative trading
by investors. Yet as the discussion explains, speculative trading does
not itself explain investor short-termism, for frequent trading can
also mean investors are buying stock that undervalues the true
value of a firm and selling stock that overvalues the true value of a
firm-so that the firm's stock price ultimately reflects its true value.
However, as Subsection 2 explains, the short-term bias of informa-
tion that is provided to public company investors causes those
investors to over-value short-term profits at the expense of long-
term profits. That means that firms' true values are overly reflective
of their short-term values and under reflective of their long-term
values. Subsection 2 also explains how investor behavior may also
contribute to this undue focus on short-term profits.
Because investors do not manage or oversee the operation of the
corporations in which they invest, this short-termism might seem to
be inapposite to the time period over which corporations are man-
aged. But as Part B explains, investor short-termism impacts board
decisions both through the shareholder voting franchise (Subsec-
tion 1) as well as through investor activism (Subsection 2).
Part C assesses why executives want boards to be short-termists
and how they influence boards to pursue their short-term agendas.
A. Sources of Investor Short-Termism
Any discussion of why investors are short-termists necessarily be-
gins with an understanding of how our stock markets support the
speculative nature of public company securities. Once we under-
stand the speculative nature of public company securities, we can
then understand how the stock markets cause speculative investors
to unduly favor the short-term.
1. Speculative Nature of Investments in Public Companies
Use of the corporate form in the U.S. became widespread in the
19th century as a result of increasing industrialization. Corpora-
tions formed during that era were largely closely-held corporations
in which the stock was held by founders, their families and friends
7. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: How FINANCE TRIUMPHED
OVER INDUSTRY 8, 11-12 (2008) (describing how the Industrial Revolution led to the
growth in size and number of corporations, partnerships, and proprietorships and the blos-
somed use of the business corporation starting in the 1840s and 1850s with the expansion of
railroads).
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and a limited number of associates." However, starting in the late
19th century and early 20th century, the size of corporations grew
significantly, largely due to a wave of mergers.
9
With this growth in corporate size came a broad expansion in
the investor base. 10 As a result, investors held securities not out of
an interest to finance a particular business, but as a way to make a
profit-or for speculation. 11
That, in turn, gave rise to the need for a stock market, where in-
vestors could buy and sell securities to realize the value of their
investments.1 2 As Berle and Means recognized as early as 1932, in-
vestors of public companies thus became mere purveyors of
capital, having relinquished the right to manage physical assets in
exchange for liquidity.
13
Where securities are traded at a higher rate than the period of
time over which a firm seeks to achieve success, it reveals that in-
vestors are trading securities to generate profits rather than to
finance the underlying business-in short, speculating. We can
thus see the speculative nature of investments in NYSE-listed com-
panies from data from 2006, when the turnover rate was 118%. 4
That means that on average, every share of stock of a NYSE-listed
company was traded at least once during the year.15 In contrast, the
average public company's life span is more than 30 years.
1 6
8. Id. at9.
9. Id. (describing the wave of mergers from 1897 to 1903 as arising due to the desire
to reduce competition, create efficiencies in size and management, and generate proceeds
from the issuance of stock to the public).
10. Id. at 4 (noting that as a result of the merger wave, middle class investors were
drawn to the market for the first time and that following the panic of 1907, small investors
increased their numbers, "pick[ing] among the bargains that were the leavings of the pluto-
crats").
11. Id. at 4-5 (describing the evolution of securities held by investors from bonds to
preferred stock to common stock).
12. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PR-
VATE PROPERTY 5-6 (1933).
13. Id. at 286.
14. MITCHELL, supra note 7, at 1 (citing John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implica-
tions of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (2005)).
15. Undoubtedly some investors traded more than once in 2006 while others held for
the entire year.
16. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REv.
1784, 1788 (2006) (finding that 63% of the Fortune 100 public companies in 2005 had gone
public before 1975); see also BERLE & MEANS, supra note 12, at 282 ("Today, the life of the
investment as such is either long, or indefinite, or perhaps perpetual, and the public inves-
tor cannot accordingly count on the release of his capital through repayment."); Roger
Lowenstein, Go Long N.Y. TIMES MAG.,Jan. 11, 2009, at 9, 9 ("Public-securities markets are a
wondrous artifice precisely because they offer permanent capital to industry and short-term
liquidity to investors.").
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The rise of the derivatives market seems to have compounded
the speculative nature of public company investments.1 7 That is be-
cause investors typically do not hold options or other derivatives
for longer than nine months. 8 Moreover, investors who hold de-
rivative securities are typically large institutions that take large
positions in those securities.'9 That fact, coupled with the sheer size
of the derivatives market, means that trades by investors in deriva-
tive securities may create movement in the price of the underlying
security.20 Investors then attempt to profit off of these adjustments
by increased trading, despite the fact that these adjustments might
not reflect any actual change in the business of, or available infor-
mation about, the issuer of the security.
2'
While speculation has characterized U.S. publicly traded securi-
ties since the early 1900s, the speculative nature of equity securities
has become more notable with the explosion in the use of hedge
funds as investment vehicles, as hedge funds often have shorter
holding periods than other investors. According to one study,
hedge funds hold their public company investments for an average
of one and a half quarters, or approximately four and a half
months. 2  This holding period is much shorter than the average
seven-quarter holding period for investors on the whole.2 One of
the oft-cited reasons why hedge funds have shorter investment ho-
rizons than other investors is the structure of their managers'
17. See Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment Theory:
Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. REV. 137, 176-78
(1991).
18. Id. at 165.
19. Id. at 176.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 177 (arguing that these adjustments in the price of the underlying secu-
rity following significant trades in the derivatives market represent a market overreaction).
22. See Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Hedge Fund Investor Activism and Takeovers
13 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Papers, Paper No. 08-004, 2007) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-004.pdf
(finding that the median position at hedge funds is held for 1.5 quarters); see also MATTEO
TONELLO, THE CONFERENCE BD., INC., HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM: FINDINGS AND REcOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS 11 (2008); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism
About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REv. 561, 579 (2006); Sebastian Mallaby,
Hands Off Hedge Funds, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 91, 92. But see William W. Bratton,
Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1413 (2007) ("[T]he activists' holding
record, while not pristine, shows that most commit to their targets for at least the intermedi-
ate term.").
23. See Greenwood & Schor, supra note 22, at 13 (finding that the median position at
non-hedge funds is held for seven quarters). But see Mdon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism,
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance 4 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Financial Working
Paper No. 139/2006, 2008) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=948907 (finding that the median holding period for
an activist hedge fund that files a Schedule 13D is one year and that analysis of other data
suggests hedge funds hold on average for closer to 20 months).
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compensation-namely, a large component of hedge fund manag-
ers' compensation is tied to total fund profits. 4 Managers whose
compensation is tied to fund profits tend to more actively manage
their portfolios because they constantly seek opportunities to in-
crease their funds' profits through speculative trading in an
attempt to increase their compensation. Other factors that might
explain hedge funds' heightened short-termism include hedge
fund managers' desire to post attractive results to raise additional
funds,2 '6 as well as fund managers' ability to act more nimbly than
other investors, 27 as hedge funds are typically not regulated under
the Investment Company Act.28 Moreover, their managers are gen-
erally not regulated under the Investment Advisers Act.2 9 This
absence of regulation, including leverage restrictions and report-
ing requirements, allows hedge funds to take larger, less diversified
positions in companies than can many other institutional inves-
tors."° This flexibility also allows them to hedge their risks
associated with these investments to a greater extent than can
other institutional investors . 3' The net result is that hedge funds
24. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Contro4 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1064 (2007) (stating that hedge fund managers
are typically paid a percentage of profits earned).
25. Id. at 1064-65 (arguing that the fact that hedge fund managers are paid a percent-
age of profits earned means that they have a big stake in the success of their funds'
investments). Because hedge fund manager compensation is not clawed back due to subse-
quent losses, there is no incentive to ensure those profits are sustained. Id. at 1064 n.208.
26. See Anabtawi, supra note 22, at 580 (noting the relationship between hedge funds'
performance and their ability to raise additional funds from the capital markets, and argu-
ing that this contributes to a preoccupation with short-term results).
27. SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 33-36 (2003) [hereinafter SEC
REPORT, HEDGE FUNDS] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
28. Id. at viii-ix, 3; Kahan & Rock, supra note 24, at 1062-63 (noting that while hedge
funds are not subject to specific regulatory constraints, they must comply with rules applica-
ble to investors generally, such as disclosure requirements under section 13(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act and the short swing profit rules under section 16(b) of that act).
The incoming administration has suggested that new regulations will be adopted, and in fact
some legislation has been proposed, requiring hedge funds, private equity funds, and other
presently unrelated investment vehicles to register with the SEC, maintain records, and
comply with disclosure requirements. See Modernizing the U.S. Financial Regulatory System:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 5 (2009)
(statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chair, Presidential Recovery Advisory Board) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://banking.senate.gov/
public/_files/VolckerTestimony2409.pdf.
29. SEC REPORT, HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 27, at x, 21, 32.
30. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 24, at 1063 (noting that hedge funds can use deriva-
tives to accumulate large economic positions without disclosure).
31. SEC REPORT, HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 27, at 37-43; TONELLO, supra note 22, at
[VOL. 43:4
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can realize larger gains from short-term trades than can more
heavily regulated, diversified investors.
As the foregoing discussion reveals, investors tend to hold their
public company investments for speculative purposes. That means
that they trade relatively frequently to try to optimize their gains
from those investments. Hedge funds on average trade more fre-
quently than other investors for reasons attributed to their
unregulated structure.
Yet public companies do not use a six month, one year, or even
two year period of time for the appreciation of corporate gains."
Rather, they typically seek to generate profits over a much longer
period of time.33 That goal is apparent from the average life span of
the public company, which in 2005 exceeded 30 years for the For-
tune 100 public companies. s It is also clear that public companies
are prospectively intended to be managed for a longer period of
time, for the business plans adopted by corporate executives under
board oversight typically state firms' objectives over the subsequent
five-year or longer period 5 In any case, even if we assume that
businesses seek to be successful over a five-year period, that is over
twice as long as the period during which investors on average hold
their shares. That alone might argue in favor of severing specula-
tive investors from business decisions, for speculative investors
would be expected to make or favor decisions that yield returns to
them over their short holding periods despite the longer time ho-
rizons adopted on behalf of corporations for the achievement of
36
corporate objectives.
32. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
34. See Bebchuk, supra note 16, at 1788.
35. See L.J. BOURGEOIS III ET AL., STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A MANAGERIAL PERSPEC-
TIVE 302 (2d ed. 1999) (stating that "[a]ll organizations of any size must plan, and planning
tends to [include] ... the development of an overarching five- and ten-year strategic
plans"); FRED R. DAVID, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS 12-13 (12th ed. 2009) (indi-
cating that strategies, or the means to reach objectives, are long-term oriented and typically
affect a corporation's prosperity over the next five or more years); Lipton & Rosenblum,
supra note 5, at 229 (noting that a standard business plan covers five years).
36. This is not inconsistent with the view that managers, who do make business deci-
sions, should hold stock in a firm to have some "skin in the game," thereby reducing some
of the agency costs associated with the severance of management from control. President's
Council of Econ. Advisers, Economic Organization and Competition Policy, 19 YALE J. ON REG.
541, 548 (2002) (noting that paying managers for performance in the form of stock and
stock options has become an increasingly prominent feature of corporate life, suggesting
that it may prove a valuable way for shareholders to reduce agency costs). That is because
while there is strong support for managers to own stock, that stock ownership is generally
intended to be a long-term rather than a short-term investment. See infra note 141 and ac-
companying text (describing the current push by the federal government to indeed make
managers' stock ownership "long-term" rather than drive them to manage for the short-
term).
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Still, the counter-argument is compelling: namely, despite the
fact that investors have short holding periods, the value of their
investments reflects not only the short-term value, but also the
long-term value, of the investee corporation. That is because the
stock market is efficient. Thus stock prices reflect not simply the
value of firms based on anticipated returns over any particular in-
vestor's holding period, but indefinitely. That means that investors
do not necessarily favor decisions that generate results in the short-
term, for the values they place on their investments also reflect the
profits to be generated in the long-term. I will address this argu-
ment next.
2. Short-Term Information Bias
In a perfectly efficient stock market, stock prices would indeed
fully reflect the intrinsic values of the firms whose stocks are traded
on that market.37 To capture a firm's intrinsic value, a firm's stock
price must reflect not only the firm's value in the short-term, but
also its value in the long-term.3 s This theory of the stock market-as
being perfectly efficient-is referred to as the efficient capital mar-
ket hypothesis, or ECMH.39 Under the ECMH, if a company's stock
price at any time does not fully reflect a proportion of the firm's
true value represented by a share of that stock, then investors will
buy that firm's stock (if the stock price is lower than the firm's true
value) or sell that firm's stock (if the stock price is higher than the
firm's true value) until the stock price does reflect a proportionate
share of the firm's true value. Thus adherents to the ECMH hail
frequent trading as a mechanism to make the stock market more
efficient, as each trade causes a firm's stock price to get closer to
the firm's true value.4°
One necessary predicate to the ECMH is the availability to inves-
tors of all relevant information about a firm, for that is the only way
investors can know a firm's true value and determine whether its
37. PETER S. ROSE, MONEY AND CAPITAL MARKETS: THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN AN IN-
CREASINCLY GLOBAL ECONOMY 542 (5th ed. 1994); Anabtawi, supra note 22, at 581; Lynn A.
Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. Cop. L.
635, 639-41 (2003).
38. Anabtawi, supra note 22, at 581 (stating that pursuant to the efficient market the-
ory, an investor's time horizon would not matter since stock prices would reflect long-term
values).
39. RosE, supra note 37, at 542; see also Stout, supra note 37, at 636.
40. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 355-58
(9th ed. 2008) (arguing that arbitrageurs immediately eliminate any discrepancy between
stock prices and firm values by trading).
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stock price undervalues or overvalues the firm.4 However, as the
Delaware courts have recognized, the stock market may not always
be efficient. 42 Specifically, information about a firm--especially
concerning its long-term value-may not be "perfect."43 There are
a number of reasons for this.
For one, it is not necessarily in investors' interest for information
concerning'a firm's long-term value to be publicly disclosed." For
example, if a firm were to publicly disclose what its managers be-
lieved was the most likely outcome of a lawsuit that has been-or
could be-lodged against the firm, that information would serve as
a cue to the plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs as to the existence of
such a lawsuit, as well as how much it may be worth. 5 Yet failing to
have that information would impair investors' ability to value the
firm in the long-term-when the liability may be realized.
41. RoSE, supra note 37, at 542; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mecha-
nisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 551-52 (1984). But see id. at 552 (arguing that
"[w]hat makes the ECMH non-trivial ... is its prediction that, even though information is
not immediately and costlessly available to all participants, the market will act as if it were").
42. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670 & 10935, 1989
WL 79880, at *19 (Del. Ch.July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) ("Directors may
operate on the theory that the stock market valuation is 'wrong' in some sense, without
breaching faith with shareholders. No one, after all, has access to more information con-
cerning the corporation's present and future condition."); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen.
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1376 (Del. 1995) (citing Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1153).
43. Moreover, as Professor Lynn A. Stout has argued, a market that is perfect in infor-
mation is not necessarily efficient in determining fundamental value because "[f]irst,
arbitrage is not a costless process ... [second, arbitrageurs] enjoy access to only finite
amounts of money... [third, arbitrageurs] are also likely to be risk-averse,... [and fourth,
arbitrageurs] can only hope to profit from their superior information if the rest of the mar-
ket eventually becomes aware of what the arb already knows, and also comes to agree with
the arb's assessment of value." Stout, supra note 37, at 655.
44. See RoSE, supra note 37, at 542-43.
45. This is a significant issue under proposed new Financial Accounting Standard
(FAS) 5, which would require disclosure about loss contingencies (including potential law-
suits) that are more than "remote" (currently only disclosure is required for "probable"
contingent losses). See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Disclosure of Certain Loss Contingencies:
An Amendment of FASB Statement No. 5 and 141(R) 5 (Fin. Accounting Series, Exposure
Draft File Reference No. 1600-100, 2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform), available at http://www.fasb.org/ed_contingencies.pdf. In addition, proposed
FAS 5 would require firms to disclose a description of the factors that are likely to affect the
ultimate outcome of that potential loss, a qualitative assessment of the most likely outcome,
and significant assumptions made in estimating the amounts disclosed. Id. 7. The Ameri-
can Bar Association has written a letter to the Financial Accounting Standards Board
emphatically objecting to the proposed changes to this rule on the basis that that disclosure
would threaten the attorney-client privilege, that there is much uncertainty in estimating
loss contingencies, and that this would create the potential for shareholder lawsuits if these
estimates turn out to be wrong. See Letter from William H. Neukom, President, Am. Bar
Ass'n, to Robert H. Herz, Chairman, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., and David Tweedy,
Chairman, Int'l Accounting Standards Bd. (Aug. 5, 2008) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/
priorities/privilegewaiver/2008aug5_privwaiv..fasbJl.pdf.
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Another example is that it is generally not in investors' interest
for firms to disclose detailed information about future prospects
and business strategies. For example, if managers disclosed a firm's
marketing strategy and identified geographic regions or sectors for
growth, that information would tip the firm's hand to its competi-
tors, which could enable the competitors to use that information to
their advantage. Yet not having that information impairs investors'
ability to estimate with any accuracy the firm's future cash flows
generated by future sales of those products in those regions. That,
in turn, impairs their ability to calculate the firm's intrinsic value,
as that is typically calculated using an estimation of future cash
flows, discounted for the future. 6
In addition, future events and circumstances are often uncertain
or unknown. Because of that uncertainty, accounting rules tend to
undervalue "future assets," or assets which may not be realized for
some time. For example, firms may not recognize revenue in con-
nection with the sale of a good or service until the good or service
is delivered, the price for the good or service is fixed or deter-
mined, and collectability is reasonably assured.4 7 That means that
unless a company publicly announces a future sale, 8 and that in-
formation is not otherwise available, investors do not factor that
information in to their determination of a firm's intrinsic value,
46. TIM KOLLER ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COM-
PANIES 56 (4th ed. 2005). Yet another example, long-recognized by the Delaware courts, is
the potential detrimental impact premature disclosure of a possible sale transaction might
have on stockholders. See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 847 n.5 (Del. 1987)
("[T] he effect of premature disclosure of merger discussions may be substantial. The prob-
ability of completing a merger benefiting all shareholders may well hinge on secrecy during
the negotiation process.").
47. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,936 (Dec. 9, 1999) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211). In addition, there must be persuasive evidence that an ar-
rangement for the sale of the good or service exists. Id. at 68,937. However, SAB 101 has
prevented firms from including in their financial statements some expected future cash
flows, which means that investors may get less information about the future cash flows of
their investee firms on which to base their computations of firm values than they did before
SAB 101. Jennifer Altamuro et al., The Effects of Accelerated Revenue Recognition on Earnings
Management and Earnings Informativeness: Evidence from SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101,
80 ACCT. Rav. 373, 375-76 (2005). Several trade groups, recognizing the importance of non-
financial disclosure as to future expectations, have proposed increasing these types of disclo-
sure. See, e.g., Am. Inst. of Certified Public Acct., The Enhanced Business Reporting
Framework (October 10, 2005), http://www.ebr360.com/downloads/ebr.framework.
publicexposure.2005.10.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(describing a framework to encourage companies to report extra-financial matters).
48. Firms are only required to announce future sales on a Current Report on Form 8-
K where they will be made pursuant to a material contract. See Rule 13a-1 1 under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2008) [hereinafter Exchange Act]; SEC,
Form 8-K § 1.01 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf.
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again tending to cause that calculation to not capture the value of
important future assets.
As another example, accounting rules do not permit firms to in-
clude the value of their brands or their relationships with
suppliers, customers and employees in their calculation of intangi-
ble assets. 49 Moreover, accounting rules require firms to expense
research and development (R&D) costs as they are incurred in-
stead of permitting firms to capitalize those costs over the useful
life of the inventions that result from the R&D. 0 This, then, leads
to a reduction in profits for the period in which these expenses are
incurred without any corresponding increase in assets. While the
purpose of this rule may have been to encourage investments in
R&D,51 in reality this means that current investors shoulder the
burden of all R&D costs, while they may (or may not) appreciate
the long-term benefits of those expenditures. This likely explains
some investors' reluctance for firms to make investments in R&D.52
Yet intangible assets may comprise a significant part of a corpora-
tion's intrinsic value. 3 That means that financial statements may
49. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., BUILT TO LAST: FOCUSING CORPORATIONS ON LONG-TERM
PERFORMANCE 4 (2007); MArrEo TONELLO, THE CONFERENCE BD., INC., REVISITING STOCK
MARKET SHORT-TERMISM 28-29 (2006).
50. See TONELLO, supra note 49, at 28-29 (arguing that current financial reporting
principles operate as a disincentive to invest in research, innovation, and other drivers of
value because investments in intangibles are expensed, not capitalized, like those on physi-
cal and financial assets); see also Enzo Baglieri et al., Evaluating Intangible Assets: The
Measurement of R&D Performance 2-3 (SDA Bocconi Sch. of Mgmt. Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 01/49, 2001) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=278260 (noting that because of the high
degree of uncertainty surrounding R&D activities, the difficulty in measuring the value of
the output of R&D and the dependency on other corporate functions, R&D has always been
treated as an expense center).
51. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM. U. L. REV.
775, 793 (2008) (explaining the justification for the rule that R&D may be expensed as in-
curred, instead of capitalized, as the encouragement of new research and development
activity and stimulation of economic growth and technological development).
52. See Anabtawi, supra note 22, at 580 (arguing that stock prices can temporarily be
increased by increasing short-term earnings by, for example, cutting research and develop-
ment expenses or capital expenditures); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 210 (arguing
that managers seeking to satisfy the short-term expectations of institutional investors sacri-
fice investments for the future, such as research and development and capital
expenditures). But see KOLLER ET AL., supra note 46, at 80-81 (arguing that stock markets
reward R&D and advertising expenditures even though those expenditures may negatively
affect short-term earnings); Kahan & Rock, supra note 24, at 1085-87 (noting the active
debate as to whether the stock market undervalues long-term investments relative to short-
term investments and the lack of clear empirical evidence showing that capital markets are
not efficient).
53. See BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLES: MANAGEMENT, MEASUREMENT, AND REPORTING 77
(2001); Baglieri et al., supra note 50, at 2 (arguing that intangible assets are increasingly
considered the ultimate roots of a company's success).
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not accurately capture one of the key drivers of future cash flows,
which again, are typically used to calculate a firm's intrinsic value.
5 4
Moreover, some commentators believe that investors tend to
overly discount the value of future returns, even when they are dis-
closed. 55 This is undoubtedly due in large part to the unreliability
of a future stream of cash flows.56 While investors cannot be blamed
for the tendency to rely on more certain historical information
rather than uncertain statements as to the future, it further
explains why a firm's stock price might not accurately depict the
long-term value of a firm even as to information as to future assets,
liabilities, and risks that is disclosed.
The fact that accounting rules, and the financial statements pre-
pared employing those rules, fail to capture the value of finns'
long-term assets and liabilities has significant implications, for a
number of studies have found that investors tend to rely heavily, if
not entirely, on financial statements in making their investment
decisions. That means that investors overly rely on short-term fi-
nancial metrics in determining firms' intrinsic values. Investor
determination of firm values from short-term financial metrics un-
doubtedly leads to a determination that is overly representative of a
firm's value in the short-term.
Still, some investors, particularly professional managers, do try
to adjust for some of the shortcomings of financial statement dis-
54. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
55. Anabtawi, supra note 22, at 581 ("Numerous studies have shown that the stock mar-
ket places a disproportionately high value on a company's near-term earnings by placing an
excessively high discount rate on its future expected earnings."); Hazen, supra note 17, at
181 ("There is considerable evidence that stock prices do not accurately discount the fu-
ture."); Wayne Joerding, Are Stock Prices Excessively Sensitive to Current Information?, 9J. EcoN.
BEHAV. & ORG. 71, 72 (1988) (arguing that stock markets are overly sensitive to short run
factors). But see George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evi-
dence and an Interpretation, 107 QJ. EcON. 573, 573-97 (1992) (arguing that investors use
"hyperbolic discounting"; in other words, they decrease their degree of discounting with
respect to pay-outs over long time horizons).
56. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 12, at 320 ("[A] nd it is not easy, if indeed, it is possible
at all, to disclose anything other than that which has actually occurred."). This is exempli-
fied by the increase in stock price caused by the recognition of revenues in a current period
instead of a future period. With the large number of restatements, perhaps investors are also
discounting the value of past results.
57. See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 49, passim (noting that emphasis on quar-
terly earnings, compensation tied to earnings per share, shortened CEO tenures, and
financial reports that fail to adequately inform about company performance impede the task
of building long-term value; and arguing that the false precision of financial statements
feeds the focus by managers, traders, and analysts on earnings per share); TONELLO, supra
note 49, at 8 (citing a study by the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research, Duke Uni-
versity, and University of Washington, finding that a majority of companies view financial
indicators based on earnings (especially earnings-per-share) as a key metric of perform-
ance).
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closures in determining a firm's intrinsic value.58 Yet not all inves-
tors have the resources available to do so. 59 That means that
different investors calculate a firm's intrinsic value differently, lead-
ing to stock trades that cause a firm's stock price to bounce around
between different perceived intrinsic values. And even the investors
who do adjust for financial statement shortcomings must do so ex-
trapolating longer-term values from information that is disclosed
and that has a short-term bent. That, too, would seem to impair
their ability to accurately determine a firm's intrinsic value.
Moreover, even a shareholder who can "accurately" calculate a
firm's intrinsic value might still prefer decisions that yield short-
term profits knowing that other investors place increased weight
on that in determining intrinsic value.6
Investors' over-reliance on short-term financial metrics in de-
termining firms' intrinsic values is exacerbated by firms' public
release of guidance as to expected earnings during the subsequent
quarter. Where a corporation issues quarterly earnings guidance,
management often feels pressure to meet or beat that guidance for
fear of disappointing investors whose expectations were set by that
guidance, as disappointed investors tend to punish a corporation
through selling its stock.6' Consequently, pressure to meet inves-
tors' expectations set through earnings guidance may cause
managers to manage with the goal of keeping a firm's stock price
58. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 40, at 338 (stating that before applying any account-
ing measure of performance, one must make "major adjustments to the income statement
and balance sheets").
59. See Stout, supra note 37, at 653 (indicating that studies suggest that where informa-
tion is technical and difficult to understand, stock prices do not quickly adjust to reflect it).
But see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 41, at 565-67 (arguing that different market mecha-
nisms operate to cause the stock market to reflect new information, even information that is
only available to a few traders, though noting that information that is less available requires
more time to become reflected in stock price). Even if we assume that all information even-
tually reaches investors, given the high turnover rate of stocks, undoubtedly many investors
are trading before relevant information reaches them.
60. See Patrick Bolton et al., Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Specu-
lative Markets, 73 REv. ECON. STUD. 577, 578 (2006) (arguing that "overconfidence provides
a source of heterogeneous beliefs among investors, which lead them to speculate against
each other").
61. See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 49, at 5 (revealing evidence which shows
that firms that issue quarterly earnings guidance attract more transient investors and have
higher trading volumes than companies that do not issue earnings guidance); John R. Gra-
ham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40J. ACCT. & EcoN. 3, 67
(2005) (noting that a majority of the over 400 chief financial officers surveyed "admit[ted]
to sacrificing long-term economic value to hit a target or to smooth short-term earnings");
David Millon, Why Is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should Be
Done About It, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890, 892 (2002) (finding that "[c]ompanies falling
short [of analyst earnings targets] by even a penny per share can see an immediate plunge
of 25 percent or more [in their stock price]").
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high, notwithstanding the impairing effect that might have on
long-term corporate performance.6 2 For example, it might lead
managers to forego incurring R&D expenses and hiring of new
employees, simply to ensure projections are met.63 It might also
lead to the temptation to manage earnings to maintain consistent,
positive numbers.64 While there is support from some in the busi-
ness and investment communities to curb the issuance of quarterly
earnings guidance,6s approximately half of all public corporations
still provide this type of guidance.6
Still other market imperfections associated with investor behav-
ior that tend to cause a short-term bias can be identified in the
62. See, e.g., COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 49, at 5 ("Most observers view company
forecasts of quarterly changes in earnings per share, and market reliance on those forecasts,
as among the primary causes of short-term behavior-possibly including aggressive account-
ing by some companies to 'make their numbers,' or postponement of valuable long-term
investments."); MITCHELL, supra note 7, at I ("A recent survey of more than four hundred
chief financial officers of major American corporations revealed that almost 80 percent of
them would have at least moderately mutilated their businesses in order to meet analysts'
quarterly profit estimates.").
63. See MITCHELL, supra note 7, at 1 ("Cutting the budgets for research and develop-
ment, advertising and maintenance and delaying hiring and new projects are some of the
long-term harms they would readily inflict on their corporations."); see also Millon, supra
note 61, at 893.
64. Millon, supra note 61, at 897. It might also lead to decisions such as layoffs to bump
up a corporation's stock price in the near term. See also Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate
Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 12 (2008) (describing the "seven per-
cent rule" prevalent during the wave of downsizings in the 1990s-and seemingly still
applicable today-in which a firm's announcement of mass layoffs leads to a 7% jump in its
stock price, and indicating that recent research shows that the long-term effect of these
downsizing efforts on stock price is at least unclear and may be negative).
65. See, e.g., COMM'N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CEN-
TURY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2007) [hereinafter 21ST CENTURY] (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://
www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/eozwwssfrqzdm3hd5siogqhp6h2ngxwdpr77qw2bogptz
vi5weu6mmi4plfq6xic7kjonfpg4q2bpks6ryog5wwh5sc/0703capmarkets~jull.pdf (promoting
the elimination of quarterly earnings per share guidance and the promulgation by public
companies of more information about their long-term business strategies and material de-
velopments between quarterly announcements of actual earnings). But see Disclosure Advisory
Board Responds to Chamber of Commerce Recommendations on Earnings Guidance, PR NEWSWIRE,
Mar. 21, 2007, http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/
www/story/03-21-2007/0004550656&EDATE= (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform) (arguing that eliminating quarterly earnings guidance is too sweeping,
and favoring a balancing of short-term and long-term guidance relative to qualitative and
quantitative measures).
66. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 49, at 5. Proponents of the practice argue that
(1) the practice is necessary to keep analysts' earnings forecasts within a reasonable range,
(2) successful forecasts increase stockholder confidence in management, and (3) good
guidance decreases information asymmetries between management and investors. SeeJoel E
Houston et al., To Guide or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings
Guidance 2 (NYU Stern Sch. of Bus. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2451/27472,
2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1280693.
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rubble of the current financial crisis, where investors seemed to all
but ignore the risks-even those that were disclosed-about the
potential collapse of the housing market.67 For example, it is argu-
able that investors were caught up in the euphoria of the housing
bubble, leading them to ignore, or choose to not understand, what
they were buying.6 Under this premise, information as to long-
term risks, while disclosed, was simply ignored.69 Another explana-
tion is that investors were simply following the herd, buying
securities that everyone else was buying.70 Thus investors got caught
up in the stampede to buy securities notwithstanding the disclosed
long-term risks of those securities.7' Still another explanation for
investors' failure to perceive the risks of a financial collapse can be
attributed to investors' tendency to over-identify with events that
they were familiar with (increases in the prices of mortgage-related
securities) and believed them likely to continue. 7' Each of these
types of investor behavior can explain why investors choose to ig-
nore, or fail to appreciate, long-term risks, even when they are
disclosed.73 Thus these, too, might explain why investors focus on
short-term profits generated by their investments notwithstanding
the longer-term risks associated with the business strategies of
those firms.
3. Summary
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the lack of public disclosure
as to the value of future assets and future sources of cash flows, as
well as future risks and liabilities, leads investors to undervalue
those long-term assets, liabilities, and risks in determining the in-
trinsic values of public firms. While some investors can more
accurately determine the intrinsic value of a firm due to their so-
phistication and resources, their ability to do so is undoubtedly
67. See ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS 2-5, 10-16 (2000) (arguing that be-
havioral finance shows that many investors act irrationally and this is not corrected through
arbitrage activity).
68. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REv. 373, 382 (2008).
69. Yet some investors may have rationally decided to ignore information as to long-
term risks, believing that they could ride out the bubble and sell their securities before the
housing market crashed.
70. Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 382.
71. Still some investors may have rationally decided to get caught up in the herd, again
on the assumption that they could sell their securities before the housing market crashed.
72. Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 382-83.
73. Investors might also ignore disclosure where they can defer to more easily inter-
preted investment signals such as rating agencies' securities ratings. Id. at 382.
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impaired by the lack of information they receive as to long-term
values. And even investors who can more accurately compute a
firm's intrinsic (including long-term) value may place a higher
value on short-term performance indicators, knowing that is how
other investors value a firm. In any case, their trades would not
necessarily cause a firm's stock price to approach a true value
which appropriately includes the long-term value of that firm.
Other investors also trading in that firm's securities who do not
have the sophistication and resources needed to calculate a firm's
long-term value would be trading using a value that gives priority to
the shorter-term value of the firm. Moreover, as behavioral eco-
nomics instructs, some investors may fail to appreciate, or may
choose to ignore, the long-term risks of their investments. That,
again, can cause a short-term bias in investor behavior, altering the
longer-term focus that might prevail in a perfect market.
Still, even with these market imperfections favoring short-term
investment profits, many investors' investment strategy is to hold
stock for a long period of time.4 Moreover, some large institutions
are long-term investors by necessity, for due to their sheer size, they
will inevitably end up holding positions in the same firms in the
future. 15 Yet the existence of investor short-termism argues in favor
of exercising caution when considering whether to implement in-
vestors' recommendations and demands in relation to how to
manage the corporation, particularly where those demands are
made by investors who are known to have short investment hori-
zons.
B. Investor Short-Termism Impacts Board Decisions
The fact that investors desire short-term results does not neces-
sarily translate into firms that are managed for the short-term. That
is because directors oversee the business and affairs of the corpora-
tions on whose boards they serve. 6 On that basis alone it would
seem that boards should be impervious to investors' demands for
short-term results. Yet there are a number of reasons why boards
74. See Charles Luftig, Note, Considered Action, Unconsidered Result: Why the Tax Relief Act
of 2003 Could Put Retirement Savings at Greater Risk 23 VA. TAX REV. 701, 711 (2004) (noting
that 96% of the equity investors surveyed described themselves as adhering to long-term
investment strategies).
75. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 216-17 ("[T]he large institutional stock-
holder is a long-term investor in the market as a whole. Unless it divests itself of equities
altogether, it will have an equity stake in a substantial portfolio of corporations regardless of
how long it maintains a stake in any one corporation.").
76. See discussion infra Part III.
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are short-termists as a result of this investor short-termism. Subsec-
tion 1 examines how investors affect board decisions through the
shareholder franchise. Subsection 2 then explores how investors
have started to influence board decisions through targeted activ-
ism.
1. Short-Term Investors Influence Board Decisions
Through the Voting Franchise
Investors elect directors, typically on an annual basis." The ight
to elect directors gives investors significant power over boards, for
it means that ultimately, boards must be accountable to investors
for their actions. That, in turn, means that directors must to an ex-
tent oblige investors' wishes, including their wishes for short-term
profits, if the directors want to be reelected.
Yet there are many who challenge the effectiveness of this ac-
countability mechanism, not only because the board, typically
through a nominating committee, decides which candidates to
nominate on behalf of the company, but also because it is typically
only those candidates who are included in the company's proxy
statement.78 Thus the solicitation of proxies for any competing slate
of directors must generally be paid for by the investor putting forth
the competing slate. 9
Still, the risk of non-reelection is becoming much more of a real-
ity as investors increasingly use the threat of a proxy contest to get
their director nominees on the company's slate of directors."' This
threat increasingly has teeth as investors have started to propose
bylaws requiring the reimbursement by a company of its stock-
holders' expenses in successfully soliciting proxies in favor of a
77. While the default rule is that directors must be elected every year, in a corporation
that has a staggered board, directors only stand for election every two or three years, de-
pending on whether the corporations' board is staggered in two or three tiers. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (d) (2001). However, the staggered board structure is disappearing,
in large part due to investor pressure to avoid director entrenchment. Lisa M. Fairfax, Mak-
ing the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 71 (2008) (citing studies
that show that by the end of 2006, a majority of the S&P 500 companies' directors were to
have been elected every year); Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards , 33
DEL.J. CoRP. L. 149, 155-56, 185, 187 (2008).
78. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REv. 675, 680,
688-95 (2007) (noting the importance of the shareholder franchise and arguing that legal
and practical impediments impair shareholders' ability to exercise that franchise to replace
the board).
79. Id. at 688-91.
80. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
SUMMER 2010]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
competing slate of directors. Under a new rule proposed by the
SEC, which many expect to pass in some form,"2 companies will not
be able to exclude these types of proposals from their proxy state-
ments.8" Stockholders will undoubtedly propose more competing
slates where their costs in doing so are covered by the company. In
addition, under the SEC's proposed rule, stockholders holding a
specified number of shares for the specified period of time will be
able to include one or more director nominees on the company's
proxy statement, also making a contested election more likely.84
Investors have also been increasing their say over board composi-
tion through provisions of the bylaws or corporate policies,
adopted by many companies at the behest of stockholders, which
call for the resignation of any director not receiving the support of
a majority of stockholders.8 5 This, too, has heightened the level of
accountability of directors to stockholders as directors face a
greater likelihood of being forced to resign.
Outside of the director election context, stockholders have been
including "say on pay" proposals-or proposals requesting that the
board obtain an advisory vote from the stockholders indicating
whether they approve or disapprove of management's compensa-
tion packages-on company proxy statements. 86 These types of
81. See, e.g., CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229-30 (Del.
2008) (describing a stockholder-proposed bylaw amendment that would require the com-
pany to reimburse the proxy solicitation expenses of a stockholder who has at least one of its
directors elected to the board in a contested election). According to the Delaware Supreme
Court in AFSCME, these types of bylaws are permissible so long as they preserve for the
board the discretion to deny reimbursement where doing so is necessary for the board to
comply with its fiduciary duties. Id. at 239-40. The new e-proxy rules and 1990 proxy rule
amendments also make it easier, and less expensive, for shareholders to solicit proxies for
competing slates of directors. Richard Morrisey, Sullivan & Cromwell L.L.P., Proxy Solicitation
Through the Internet, in SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE:
A CONTRAST IN EU AND U.S. PROVISIONS 583, 585 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Series No. 1643, 2008); see also Rule 14 a-1(1) (2) under the Exchange Act, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (1) (2) (2008); Rule 14a-2(b) (1) under the Exchange Act, id. § 240.14a-
2(b) (1); Rule 14a-16 under the Exchange Act, id. § 240.14a-16.
82. See, e.g., Jeffrey McCracken & Kara Scannell, Fight Brews as Proxy-Access Nears, WALL
ST.J., Aug. 26, 2009, at C1.
83. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed
June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 274).
84. See id.
85. See Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to
Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1386 (2007) ("At the start of 2005, fewer than thirty of
the Standard & Poor's 500 had bylaws or policies requiring a majority voting standard. By
early 2006, this figure had increased to roughly 145."); see also William K. Sjostrom, Jr. &
Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 473 (2007);
Vincent Falcone, Note, Majority Voting in Director Elections: A Simple, Direct, and Sift Solution?,
2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 844,860 (2007).
86. See SEC, DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE: STAFF LEGAL BULLETIN No. 14A
(2002) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
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proposals are useful in that they afford stockholders a way to col-
lectively make recommendations to management without forcing
them to pay for the solicitation of proxies in support of the pro-
posal. However, because management may exclude from the
company's proxy statement any proposal that would be improper
under state law or that relates to a company's "ordinary business
operations,"8 shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 have histori-
cally been limited to matters of corporate governance or social
responsibility proposals that do not affect the corporation as a
profit-making institution, and have often taken the form of preca-
tory-or non-binding-proposals."8 Again, Rule 14a-8 is likely to
become much more important to stockholders with respect to the
election of directors if the SEC's proposed rule described above
passes.
Investors also have the right to vote on certain significant trans-
actions. These transactions include mergers, sales of all or
substantially all of firms' assets and dissolutions. 9 That means that
boards may not pursue these types of transactions without share-
holder support, and in that way, are held accountable to
stockholders. Perhaps more importantly, any board decision to
implement defenses to a takeover offer must meet higher-than-
normal fiduciary duty standards.90
Yet these voting rights do not give shareholders the power to ini-
tiate these types of takeover transactions. Rather, they must be
approved by the board, who then must submit the transaction to
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslbl4a.htm (indicating the SEC's position as to which
.say on pay" proposals are excludable and which are not under Rule 14a-8); Sandeep
Gopalan, Say on Pay and the SEC Disclosure Rules: Expressive Law and CEO Compensation, 35
PEPP. L. REV. 207, 219 (2008). Congress has recently passed legislation that will give inves-
tors of public companies that receive funds under the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP)--established under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008-a say on
pay, and the Securities and Exchange Commission has recently passed a rule implementing
this legislative mandate. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5,
§ 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516-20 (2009); Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act,
H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007); Rule 14a-20 under the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-20
(2010).
87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (1), (7) (2008).
88. See SEC, DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE: STAFF LEGAL BULLETIN No. 14, at 27
(2001) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/cfslbl4.pdf ("In our experience, we have found that proposals that
are binding on the company face a much greater likelihood of being improper under state
law and, therefore, excludable under rule 14a-8(i) (1)."); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passiv-
ity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 541 (1990).
89. SeeDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 271, 275 (2001).
90. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985)
(setting forth an "enhanced duty" before the business judgment rule is applied to a board's
decision to adopt defensive measures in response to a takeover offer "[blecause of the om-
nipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests").
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the stockholders for approval.9 ' Stockholders do, however, have the
right to initiate a sale of their stock, either in a stand-alone transac-
tion or to an acquirer through a collective tender offer. This is
undoubtedly one of the most important tools stockholders have
traditionally used to keep boards in line with their interests, for it
allows stockholders to vote against the board by using their feet.
92
Still, boards have traditionally employed any number of defenses to
either prevent or make more difficult takeovers via tender offers.
These defenses include the poison pill,93 golden parachute pay-
ments to executives,94 and a staggered board structure. 95 Moreover,
Delaware, like many other states, has an anti-takeover statute that
deters takeovers structured as tender offers. 96 Still, many of these
board-adopted defensive measures are in decline as these measures
are perceived as simply ways to entrench boards, rather than
mechanisms boards may use to protect investors from coercive and
inadequate takeover offers.97 Golden parachutes have been espe-
cially susceptible to challenge as pressure mounts on boards to tie
91. SeeDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 271, 275.
92. See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
407, 409, 425 (2006) (arguing that the right to sell shares is one of the most fundamental
rights of shareholders because it allows shareholders to obtain the economic benefits from
their investments and allows shareholders to exit if they become dissatisfied with manage-
ment).
93. A poison pill is a device through which current stockholders, excluding the at-
tempting acquirer, receive the right to convert a security into additional shares of stock at an
extreme discount, thereby making the takeover significantly more expensive for the ac-
quirer. See 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 1085-91 (5th ed. 1998). The Delaware courts more highly scrutinize
these types of defensive measures, particularly when they are taken in the face of a pending
takeover offer, than they do other business decisions. See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. Re-
cently a number of stockholders have proposed bylaw amendments which require
stockholder approval before the board can renew a poison pill. See Victor Lewkow & Sarah
ten Siethoff, The Embattled Poison Pill in CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 2007: CUR-
RENT OFFENSIVE & DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES IN M&A TRANSACTIONS 403, 405 (PLI Corporate
Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1584, 2007).
94. This defense triggers a large balloon payment to certain executive officers upon a
change in control, thus making the acquisition more expensive. I BLOCK ET AL., supra note
93, at 1296-98.
95. This type of "shark repellant" makes it impossible to replace the entire board at a
single annual stockholders meeting. Id. at 1246, 1249, 1278-83. See supra note 77 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of the decline in popularity of the staggered board
structure.
96. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203.
97. See Jim Mallea, M&A Year End Review, FACTSET MERGERS, Jan. 23, 2009,
https://www.factsetmergers.com/marequest?an=dt.getPage&st=l &pg=/pub/rs.20090122.ht
ml&rnd=970861 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (noting
the six-year trend towards decreasing takeover defenses). But see id. (noting the surge in pill
adoptions late in 2008 leading to the highest annual rate of pill adoptions since 2002, and
arguing that this is likely related to the precipitous drop in valuations and increased risk of
takeovers rather than a sea change in the current thinking on poison pills).
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manager compensation to long-term performance."8 In any event,
it would be unduly simplistic to assume that directors always seek to
avoid a takeover due to their self-interest in remaining as directors.
In fact, with the current wave of pressure on directors to hold stock
and have some "skin in the game," it may be in directors' interests
to consummate a takeover to realize the value of their stock hold-
ings.
Even without an actual takeover offer, the mere possibility that a
potential acquirer will make an unwanted offer undoubtedly keeps
boards accountable to stockholders." This is typically manifested
through board actions aimed at maintaining a high stock price,
thereby making it less likely that an acquirer can offer an attractive
control premium to the shareholders."°
Finally, stockholders have the right to approve amendments to a
firm's charter submitted to them by the board, as well as the right
to amend the bylaws without director action.'1 Stockholders have
actually been increasingly using the right to amend the bylaws to
give themselves a more effective voice in the election of directors.'
While bylaws only define the processes and procedures by which
board decisions are made,0 3 it is clear that regulating those proc-
esses and procedures can have a significant impact on the
substance of the decisions made using them.
0 4
As the foregoing discussion reveals, shareholders may hold di-
rectors accountable to their interests through their statutory voting
rights. Most importantly, shareholders have the right to elect direc-
tors, which is becoming increasingly effective as a result of majority
98. See 1 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 93, at 1298 (explaining the many grounds on which
golden parachutes have been criticized and noting they are often de minimus in comparison
to the deal size); see also discussion infra note 142 and accompanying text (explaining how
recent laws restrict the payment of golden parachutes by companies receiving funds from
the U.S. Treasury).
99. See Hazen, supra note 17, at 182.
100. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FiN.
EcoN. 409, 410-11 (2005); Hazen, supra note 17, at 182.
101. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a); see also CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension
Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008) (holding that the stockholders' power to amend the
bylaws cannot be non-consensually eliminated or limited by anyone other than the legisla-
ture).
102. See, e.g., AFSCME, 953 A.2d at 229-30; supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
103. See id. at 234-35 ("It is well-established Delaware law that a proper function of by-
laws is not to mandate how the board should decide specific substantive business decisions,
but rather, to define the process and procedures by which those decisions are made.").
104. For example, as the Delaware Supreme Court noted in AFSCAIE, stockholders may
adopt a bylaw requiring the reimbursement of any stockholder for its proxy expenses in-
curred in conducting a successful competing proxy solicitation, as that primarily relates to
the process for the election of directors; provided that, as was not the case with the
AFSCME-proposed bylaw, the board retains the authority to deny such reimbursement
where to do so would be required by their fiduciary duties. Id. at 234-40.
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vote bylaws as well as reforms aimed at increasing the likelihood of
a contested director election. Shareholders also have the right to
approve many significant transactions. These accountability mecha-
nisms allow stockholders to influence board decisions. Still, these
accountability mechanisms typically require the vote of a majority
of shareholders for success. That means that they are less useful to
minority investors seeking to individually influence board actions.
That, perhaps, explains the rise of the non-voting channels of in-
fluence discussed next.
2. Short-Term Investors Influence Board Decisions Outside of the
Voting Franchise-Modern Trends in Activism
The foregoing discussion does not reveal the true extent of in-
vestor influence on boards, for it depicts investors who are limited
in their mode of influence to the stockholder voting franchise. But
this is no longer true, particularly in the wave of activism that has
emerged following the numerous collapses of the early 2 1" century,
where many boards were perceived as having failed to actively over-
see the corporations under their charge.'0 5
In this new era of activism, investors influence boards directly,
without involving other stockholders. Some of the mechanisms
employed by investors to influence boards include demand letters
sent to the board, 1 6 often made public through the filing of the
letter on a Schedule 13D,' °7 and publicity campaigns.0 8 Investors
have also been using the threat of a proxy contest to obtain board
105. But see April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds
and Other Private Investors 10 (NYU Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-41,
2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract-913362 (noting that institutional investors began to seek changes using
informal communications starting in the 1980s, but these efforts had little impact on firm
performance or stock price).
106. See e.g., The Children s Investment Master Fund Urges CSX to Take Immediate Action to Improve
Corporate Governance and Business Performance, Bus. WiRE, Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.
businesswire.com/news/home/20071016005752/en/Childrens-nvestment-Master-Fund-Urges-
CSX-Action (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (including a letter
from The Children's Investment Master Fund to the CSX board calling for the CSX board to
separate the chairman and CEO roles and align management compensation with shareholder
interests, among other things).
107. See, e.g., CNET Networks, Inc., Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D), at
7-9 (Dec. 26, 2007) (filed by JANA Partners LLC) (disclosing a letter revealing JANA's
intention to increase CNET's board size and to solicit proxies in favor ofJANA's nominees).
108 See, e.g., Press Release, Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P., Pershing Square Capi-
tal Management Announces Public Presentation on Target Corporation on Wednesday,
October 29, 2008 (Oct. 28, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform), available at http://www.smartbief.com/news/aaaa/industryPR-detailjsp?id=
88A02468-EFC6-4FC9-A425-E2D675E9154A; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 24, at 1029.
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concessions, often leading the board to include the threatening
investor's candidates in the slate of directors nominated by the
board109
Through these informal channels, some investors have been ex-
panding their scope of influence beyond matters on which they
have a voting right. These investors, especially hedge funds, now
commonly seek to influence boards on ordinary business decisions,
such as the sale of dormant assets or lines of business," the de-
crease of capital expenditures,"' and the payment of dividends or
repurchase of shares." 2 They also seek to influence board decisions
as to potential takeovers before stockholders have the right to vote
on the transaction.
Based on the impact they have had on firms, some of these activ-
ist efforts appear designed to deliver a short-term spike in stock
price. This is supported by the results of a study conducted by April
Klein and Emanuel Zur in which they found that while the stock
prices of the targets of hedge fund activism were abnormally high
throughout the year following activism,"4 there was no evidence
that those targets in fact became more profitable one year follow-
ing the activism." 5 On the contrary, they found a deterioration in• • 116
those firms' profitability one year following the activism. Other
109. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 24, at 1029; see also Klein & Zur, supra note 105, at 67.
110. See e.g., Kerr McGee Corp., Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D), at sched.
A (Mar. 3, 2005) (filed by Icahn Partners L.P.) (describing Icahn's demand that the Kerr
McGee board repurchase stock, sell the chemical unit and lock in oil prices on future pro-
duction).
111. See, e.g., Applebee's Int'l, Inc., Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D/A,
Amend. No.1), at exhibit B (Dec. 11, 2006) (filed by Breeden Capital Mgmt. LLC) (describ-
ing Breeden Capital's demands on Applebee's board that they decrease capital
expenditures).
112. See, e.g., Brooks Automation, Inc., Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D/A,
Amend. No.7), at exhibit 1 (Sep. 26, 2007) (filed by The D3 Family Fund, L.P.) (disclosing a
letter from investor David Nierenberg to Robert Lepofsky, the chief executive officer of
Brooks Automation, demanding that Brooks Automation repurchase shares of its stock over
the next 3-4 years).
113. See, e.g., Lexar Media, Inc., Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D), at ex-
hibit B (Mar. 20, 2006) (filed by Elliott Assocs., L.P.); Lexar Media, Inc., Beneficial
Ownership Report (Schedule 13D/A, Amend. No.1), at 2 (Apr. 6, 2006) (filed by Icahn
Partners Master Fund LP) (describing Elliott Associates' and Icahn's pressure on the Micron
board to oppose the acquisition of Lexar).
114. Klein & Zur, supra note 105, at 38, 40.
115. Id. at 40.
116. Id. at 43 (finding that there is no immediate increase in the firm's accounting prof-
itability or other firm performance indicators either pre- or post-activism, and finding, on
the contrary, evidence that earnings-per-share ratios (EPS) may decline in the year following
the investment that triggers 13D filing requirements). Klein and Zur also found that hedge
fund targets were not particularly poor performers. See id. at 24 (finding that the targets of
hedge funds have higher earnings, are financially healthier, and have more cash on their
balance sheets than targets of other entrepreneurial activists). But see Greenwood & Schor,
SUMMER 2010]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
studies and reports have found similar, deleterious long-term ef-
fects of this type of activism on public corporations."7 Even if we
cannot conclusively establish that any particular case of activism is
designed to generate short-term returns for investors, the empiri-
cal evidence of the effects of activism does suggest the truth of this
conclusion in many cases. This conclusion also seems consistent
with the conclusion in Section A that many investors, particularly
hedge funds, are short-termists who desire short-term results. We
should indeed expect investors who are short-termists and who use
a strategy of activism to use their sway to bring about short-term
results, regardless of the adverse impact that might have on a firm
in the long-term.
Many of the reasons discussed in Section A as to why hedge
funds are often shorter-term investors than other investors also ex-
plain why many hedge funds are more active than other types of
investors. 118 Namely, because hedge funds are not subject to the
diversification requirement under the Investment Company Act,
they can take larger stakes in public companies than can other in-
stitutional investors that are subject to that act."9 That, in turn,
enables hedge funds to receive a larger proportionate share of the
benefits generated by their activism than they otherwise would with
a smaller ownership percentage. ° Moreover, because they gener-
ally earn a percentage of fund profits, fund managers have an
incentive to use activism to bring about corporate decisions that
generate profits in the short-term.'' This incentive exists notwith-
supra note 22, at 24 (finding that the targets of hedge funds underperformed relative to
other firms in their industry). While the Klein/Zur study does not look at the impact of this
activism over a period of longer than one year, the data does suggest that returns, while
initially positive, decrease over time. See Klein & Zur, supra note 105, at 40.
117. See, e.g., Jonathan Karpoff et al., Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Em-
piricalEvidence, 42J. FIN. ECON. 365, 365-69 (1996) (finding shareholder proposals targeting
corporate governance issues ineffective at increasing shareholder value or improving firm's
longer-term operating performance). But see Bray et al., supra note 23, at 3 (finding a statis-
tically meaningless reaction from the market for capital structure-related activism and
governance-related activism but a positive abnormal reaction where hedge funds are active
in changing a company's business strategy or a sale of the company); Roberta Romano, Less
is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18
YALE J. ON REG. 174, 177 (2001) (noting that the empirical evidence suggests that share-
holder activism has an insignificant effect on targeted firms' performance, and that while a
few studies find evidence of a positive impact, other studies find a significant negative stock
price effect from activism).
118. In their study, Robin Greenwood and Michael Schor found that hedge funds en-
gaged in activism using 13D filings more than four times as often as other institutional
investors. See Greenwood & Schor, supra note 22, at 10.
119. See supra notes 28-30.
120. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 24, at 1062 (arguing that evidence suggests that
hedge funds enjoy significant economies of scale).
121. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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standing any longer-term downside to the firm from those deci-
sions. 2  The fact that hedge funds can reduce or eliminate the
economic risk associated with their investments 12 might also ex-
plain their disproportionate activism, for it creates an incentive for
them to influence decisions to create stock price spikes, but also to




As the foregoing discussion reveals, investors are becoming in-
creasingly influential in corporate decision-making through non-
voting channels. Empirical evidence suggests that some of those
activist efforts, particularly those by hedge funds, may impair firm
profitability in the long-term. Yet even on a theoretical level, inves-
tor short-termism coupled with the rise of activism is worrisome,
for it leads intuitively to the conclusion that investors will, on occa-
sion, use activism to bring about decisions that create short-term
value, even where that might impair the long-term well-being of a
firm.
Advocates of shareholder voice have justified shareholders' abil-
ity to influence the board on the basis that shareholders as a class
would never vote to adopt measures that did not benefit share-
holders collectively-as represented by approval by a majority of
shareholders.2 2 This was supported by the number of shareholder
proposals that addressed social concerns of pension funds that did
not receive majority vote approval. 12 6 But now that shareholders are
affecting corporate decisions outside of the shareholder franchise,
it once again raises the concern that shareholders are influencing
122. This is the same phenomenon that causes officers to be short-termists that is dis-
cussed infra in Part I.C.
123. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
124. The King Pharmaceuticals-Mylan Laboratories merger is one of the primary exam-
ples of a hedge fund hedging away its economic risk associated with a firm's stock and then
supporting a merger of that firm with another in which the hedge fund owned a substantial
interest at a price that stockholders generally viewed as inadequate. See Kahan & Rock, supra
note 24, at 1075 (describing the Mylan Laboratories transaction as "[a] particularly extreme
form of a hedging-related conflict"). While the hedge fund did not use activism to influence
the Mylan Laboratories board to seek a merger, it is not difficult to imagine a situation
where a hedge fund would seek to influence that decision through activism. See Anabtawi &
Stout, supra note 6, at 1286-87 (indicating that conflicts between activists and other share-
holders can exist when activist shareholders take "adverse positions" in derivatives or in
securities offered by other companies, and citing as an example a hedge fund that takes a
net short position in a company, which allows the hedge fund to profit from its status as a
shareholder, and pushes for corporate strategies that drive share price down).
125. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the Busi-
ness Roundtable, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 557, 564 (2005) ("Indeed, past voting patterns
clearly indicate that shareholder resolutions that are brought because of their appeal to
shareholders with special interests generally do not pass.").
126. See discussion supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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board decisions in their own self-interest, without any "cleansing"
majority shareholder vote to ensure their actions benefit the ma-
jority of shareholders. The fact that many activist investors have
shorter investment horizons than other investors only contributes
to the long-term risk to corporations of this type of activism.
C. Executive Officer Short-Termism Affects Board Decisions
Investors are not the only class of corporate constituent that has
reasons to pressure the board for decisions that yield short-term
results. Executive officers also have reasons to want a corporation
to be profitable in the short-term.
The primary rationale for executives' short-term focus is the
prevalence of the executive compensation practice of tying execu-
tive compensation to short-term financial metrics such as stock
price and earnings per share.1 17 This creates an incentive for
officers to manage with the goal of maximizing short-term profits,
128thereby increasing the amount of their compensation. This short
termism by officers impacts boards, for boards rely heavily on offi-
cers to provide the information the board needs to make business
decisions. 29 Thus officers have an incentive-and the means-to
provide information favoring short-term business decisions. Boards
also rely heavily on officers in forming strategy, for boards are ef-
127. See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 49, at 3 ("Performance triggers for incentive
payments, when used, are often tied to short-term financial indicators such as annual earn-
ings per share or share-price performance. Such targets encourage executives to adopt too
short a time horizon and to focus too much on short-term share price and accounting
measures and not enough on long-term strategic development."); Susan J. Stabile, Motivat-
ing Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation Positively Affect Managerial Performance, 2 U.
PA.J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 234 (1999).
128. See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 49, at 3. One might ask why shareholders
tolerate such lavish pay practices, as that likely means there are fewer assets available to
shareholders. One likely reason is that this practice does not constitute a breach of any duty
owed to shareholders so long as there is a rational business purpose associated with the
compensation decision, and the decision is not made in bad faith. See In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006). Moreover, short-termists likely tolerate this
practice as it means that managers are generating short-term profits for their benefit as well.
See discussion supra Part IA; see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, The Dividend Puzzle: Are Shares
Entitled to the Residual?, 32J. CORP. L. 103, 151-52 (2006) (arguing that while shareholders
do not have the right to receive dividends, they have the good fortune of receiving them as a
side-effect of managerial self-enrichment).
129. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Direc-
tors, 33 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 89, 105 (2004) ("As a practical matter, the outside directors must
rely on information presented to them by the corporation's officers when making deci-
sions.... Given these constraints of time and information, the board can hardly initiate
much of any corporate strategy or decisions. Instead, the board's role largely falls to ap-
proval of such strategies and decisions as officers bring before the board.").
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fectively overseers of the strategic-planning process.3 0 Again, to the
extent officers control strategy-setting and related information
flows to the board, that process is undoubtedly imbued by officers'
short-term agendas. This is particularly true as boards become
more independent per SEC and stock exchange rules, placing
them more at the mercy of corporate insiders for information and
strategic ideas.13'
There is a strong movement afoot to tie officer compensation to
long-term performance targets."2 This is exemplified by the large
number of proposals made by shareholders since 2006 requesting
that shareholders be given an advisory vote on executives' compen-
sation, or a "say on pay.", 3  While those proposals generally do not
identify as their goal a desire to tie management compensation to
long-term performance, boards seems to interpret that as their im-
plicit purpose, as they generally respond by identifying how their
compensation arrangements already award managers for long-term
profitability.
34
The federal government, too, has immersed itself in this move-
ment towards coupling manager compensation and long-term
corporate performance. While the world awaited a quick Congres-
sional response to the financial crisis that threatened the survival
of insurance giant AIG and banks Bank of America and Citigroup,
among others, Congress debated how to limit the profit-based com-
pensation of the executives whose institutions were ailing and
130. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corpo-
rate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA.
L. REv. 1399, 1415 (2005) ("[T]he board of directors will actually direct and monitor the
management of the company, including strategic business plans . ..").
131. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composi-
tion and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAw. 921, 951 (1999) (citing Barry Baysinger & Robert E.
Hoskisson, The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control. Effects on Corporate Strat-
egy, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 72 (1990)) (arguing that insiders may be better at making
strategic planning decisions). But see Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate
Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO.
L.J. 797, 803 (2001) (arguing that objective outsiders also serve a useful purpose in strategic
planning as they can expose insiders' biases).
132. See Lucian A. Bebchuk &Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the
Issues, 30J. Corp. L. 647, 670 (2005).
133. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp., Definitive Additional Proxy Soliciting Materials and
Rule 14(a) (12) Materials (Schedule 14A), at 2 (May 12, 2008) ("The Board works diligently
to ensure that the Company's compensation philosophy and elements drive behavior that is
aligned with long-term shareholder value creation."); UnitedHealth Group Inc., Definitive
Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 21 (Apr. 29, 2008) ("We endeavor to closely align these
goals [the achievement of enterprise, business unit, and individual goals] with shareholder
interests by defining expected business, customer and employee outcomes that create
shareholder value over the longer term.").
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needed financial assistance. 135 The result was a host of restrictions
in the law setting forth the U.S. Treasury's initial effort at a bail-
out-the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, or
EESA-aimed at de-coupling executive compensation and short-
term performance at companies that receive meaningful financial
assistance from the U.S. Treasury.36 These restrictions include a
prohibition on senior executives' compensation for "unnecessary
and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial institu-
tion. ,'3  Moreover, those executives must repay any income
awarded to them due to financial performance that later turns out
to be materially erroneous."' And none of those executives may
receive a severance bonus upon a change in control while the
Treasury holds its investment.
1 3 9
Congress passed a second bail-out law-the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, or ARRA-on the heels of the
EESA, with the goal of stimulating the U.S. economy primarily
through federal tax cuts, job creation, and domestic spending ini-•• 140 TeAR
uiatives. The ARRA greatly expands on the EESA's compensation
restrictions by capping the amount of incentive compensation that
may be paid to senior executives of companies that receive finan-
cial assistance under the EESA to one third of the amount of their
salaries.' 1 Yet the ARRA goes further, capping the salaries, not only
of top executives, but also of the next 20 most highly paid employ-
ees, at companies that receive exceptional assistance from the U.S.
Treasury.' 4 While these restrictions follow on the heels of the
135. See 110 CONG. REc. HI0,702-10, H10,712-06 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2008); 110 CONG.
Rc. S10,220-83, S10,291-95 (daily ed. Oct 1, 2008); 110 CONG. REc. H10,337-11 (daily ed.
Sept. 29, 2008).
136. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5201-5261
(West Supp. 2009), amended by American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L.
111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516-20 (2009).
137. Id. § 5221(b)(2)(A).
138. Id. § 5221 (b) (2) (B). This requirement is similar to the claw-back provision of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, though SOX requires misconduct for the claw-back require-
ment to kick in. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7243(a) (West 2009).
139. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221 (b) (2) (C).
140. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 3, 123 Stat. at 115-16.
141. Id. § 7001, 123 Stat. at 517-18. Moreover, this incentive compensation may only be
paid in the form of long-term restricted stock. Id.
142. Id. This restriction applies to officers and employees at companies that receive
more than $500 million in funding under the TARP established under the EESA. Id. The act
also expands the ban on golden parachutes under the EESA so that it applies to all compa-
nies that receive funds from the U.S. Treasury under the TARP. Id. This act more broadly
implements some of the guidelines that had previously been promulgated by the U.S.
Treasury, also aimed at limiting the compensation of top executives. See Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on Executive Compensation (Feb.
4, 2009) [hereinafter Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury] (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
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EESA's efforts to curb the mis-match between executive compensa-
tion and true long-term performance, they clearly go further by
limiting the total compensation (regardless of long-term profitabil-
ity) that may be paid to the most highly compensated employees at
all companies that receive funds from the U.S. Treasury.143
These new bail-out laws are clearly targeted at limiting the in-
centives for executives to manage in a way that benefits themselves
financially in the short-term, notwithstanding the future risks those
decisions pose, including the disappearance of those profits over
the long-term. Still, the EESA and ARRA only apply to firms that
receive financial assistance from the U.S. Treasurym-and many of
the restrictions only apply to the senior executives at firms that re-
ceive significant financial assistance. Yet it should be obvious that
the compensation problems that these laws seek to address are not
limited to the few institutions that obtain financial assistance from
the U.S. Treasury. Nevertheless, through these laws Congress likely
sought to set new standards in the area of executive compensation,
to be followed by boards of firms that do not receive the U.S. Treas-
ury's financial assistance.144 This is consistent with the message that
has been repeatedly delivered by President Obama's administra-
tion that the administration is placing at the top of its agenda
curbing the mis-match between executive compensation and cor-
145porate performance.
tgl5.htm. In these guidelines, the Treasury also called for the SEC's cooperation to pass
regulations that require compensation committees of all public financial institutions to
review and disclose executive and certain employee compensation arrangements and ex-
plain how these compensation arrangements are consistent with promoting sound risk
management and long-term value creation for their companies and their shareholders. Id.
The Federal Reserve is also in the process of proposing new rules that would give it an effec-
tive approval right over all bankers' pay with the goal of restricting pay plans that encourage
reckless behavior by rewarding only short-term gains. Damian Paletta & Jon Hilsenrath,
Bankers Face Sweeping Curbs on Pay, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2009, at Al.
143. As Professor Lucian Bebchuk has argued, the restriction in the ARRA
"[m]andating that at least two-thirds of an executive's total pay be decoupled from perform-
ance, as the stimulus bill does, is a step in the wrong direction," as it constrains boards'
ability to reward executives for long-term performance. Lucian Bebchuk, Congress Gets Puni-
tive on Executive Pay, WALL ST.J., Feb. 17, 2009, at A15.
144. This seems to be yet another example of Congress treading on state corporate
law's domain of regulating internal affairs of corporations incorporated in those states. See
THoMAs LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 809 (5th ed. 2006) (noting a
departure after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 from the dichotomy where states define
officers' and directors' duties and federal securities laws regulate information provided to
investors). On that basis, I question whether a federal, one-size fits all legislation in the area
of executive compensation is the best way to address the problem of excessive short-termism,
especially given the myriad of different reasons why investors and boards are short-termists,
as discussed in this Article. My recommendation for addressing the short-termism problem
in a more general way is discussed in Part V infra.
145. See. e.g.. Pres. Barack Obama, Remarks by President Barack Obama on Executive
Compensation with Secretary Geithner (Feb. 4, 2009) (transcript available at
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Still, these acts only address one source of short-termism-that
created by executive compensation practices. They do not, how-
ever, provide a comprehensive approach to the problem of short-
termism, nor do they offer a coherent strategy to re-orient boards
and managers on the long-term.
D. Summary
While the stock market would, in an ideal world, cause investors
to price a corporation's stock at its true value, we do not live in an
ideal world. Stock prices seem to overly reflect firms' short-term
values. That largely stems from investors' over-reliance on financial
statements that fail to capture firms' long-term values. While not
every investor is a "short-termist," these information biases would
tend to make investors more short-termist than they might other-
wise be. Investor short-termism also emerges from investors'
irrational behavior, exemplified by the current financial crisis in
which investors got caught up in the housing bubble and herded
to the same financial securities despite the long-term risks of those
investments.
Investors whose investment strategies include activism tend to
have shorter investment horizons than the average investor. These
investors have been using techniques outside of the shareholder
franchise to compel boards to make decisions that benefit these
investors in the short-term, while having a potential value-
destroying impact on the corporation in the long-term. Directors
are not impervious to these short-term pressures, not only because
they risk not being reelected if they appear to be unresponsive to
shareholder demands, but also because they are exposed to the
risk of ouster in connection with a takeover transaction if they do
not maintain a high stock price. Directors likely also focus on
short-term performance because that is the time period as to which
executives are concerned, due to the nature of their compensa-
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/RemarksbyPresidentBarackObamaOnExecuti
veCompensationSecretaryGeithner) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) ("[I]n order to restore our financial system, we've got to restore trust. And in order
to restore trust, we've got to make certain that taxpayer funds are not subsidizing excessive
compensation packages on Wall Street."); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, supra note
142 ("[T]he standards [referring to the new Treasury guidelines on executive pay] . .. mark
the beginning of a long-term effort to examine both the degree that executive compensa-
tion structures at financial institutions contributed to our current financial crisis and how
corporate governance and compensation rules can be reformed to better promote long-
term value and growth for shareholders, companies, workers and the economy at large and
to prevent such financial crises from occurring again.").
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tion. That impacts the board because the executive officers are the
board's primary source for information about the corporation's
operations as well as areas for growth. Moreover, the executive offi-
cers actually develop and implement the corporation's strategy
while the board merely oversees that from its independence perch.
But is short-termism necessarily a bad thing? In other words,
might it not be a good thing to allow investors and managers to
profit off of short-term stock price movements, even if that impairs
a corporation's long-term success? That is the question that I turn
to next.
II. Is SHORT-TERMISM BAD?
We need to look no further than the current financial meltdown
to get a sense of the ill effects of corporate short-termism, not just
on individual business enterprises, but on the entire U.S. economy
and community. To set the stage, we must first understand the role
of short-termism in causing the recent crisis.
Leading up to the current financial crisis, financial institutions
took large positions in mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and col-
lateralized debt obligations (CDOs) .46 MBSs are securities whose
payment derives principally or entirely from mortgage loans, while
CDOs are securities whose payment derives from a mixed pool of
mortgage loans and other receivables. 4 1 When home prices plum-
meted in 2008, many borrowers defaulted on their loans, including
loans that backed MBSs and CDOs. 14' The result was either the im-
pairment, or total loss, in value of MBSs and CDOs, particularly
those that were more junior in priority of payment.
149
One of the primary reasons why financial institutions invested so
heavily in these securities is that they failed to appreciate the
longer-term risks associated with these investments-particularly
146. According to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, subprime lending grew
from $35 billion in 1994 to $600 billion in 2006. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Gover-
nors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the National Community Reinvestment Coalition
Annual Meeting (Mar. 14, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke2008O3l4a.htm) (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform). These sub-prime loans were loans that backed MBSs and CDOs. See
Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 375-76 (explaining how the subprime mortgage meltdown in-
fected the markets for MBSs and CDOs).
147. Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 376. There is a separate class of securities that is backed
by a mixed pool of MBSs and other asset-backed securities (ABSs), referred to as ABS CDOs.
Id. To the extent those pools contain MBSs, they, too, derive their payments from mortgage
loans. Id.
148. Id. at 378-79.
149. Id.
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the risk of a housing market collapse. 5° This may have resulted
from the euphoria of the moment (i.e., a bubble), where investors
failed to pay close attention to what they were buying,5 ' or the
herding phenomenon, meaning investors simply followed the pack
to invest in MBSs and CDOs. 5 2 Or it may have resulted from factors
similar to those that impel executives to manage for the short-
term-namely, compensation for originators and investment
bankers that was tied to short-term success (i.e., security place-
ment) notwithstanding the longer-term risks of an investment in
the securities they originated and sold.1 3 As a consequence, many
firms had large exposures to MBSs and CDOs that, once the
longer-term risks materialized, generated tremendous firm losses,
reversing previously realized profits.
54
These losses have had a significant impact not only on the firms
that invested in the MBSs and CDOs, but also on the entire U.S.
economy. Due to the failure of so many financial institutions, the
credit markets have seized up, making it very difficult for U.S.
businesses to get the debt financing they have needed to operate.
5 5
This has, in turn, led to a dramatic decline in capital spending and
R&D.
15 6
This is alarming, for capital investments and R&D are the life-
blood of corporate growth. 5 Without these types of investments
150. Id. at 379 (arguing that the failure of investors to envision a worst-case scenario
that would result from the fall of the housing market reflected to some extent a failure to
take a sufficiently long-term view of risk); see also Lowenstein, supra note 16, at 10 ("Nobody
[who invested in MBSs and in the banks that own them] was thinking about what these
companies were worth, only about the next quotation on the screen."). But see Schwarcz,
supra note 68, at 380 (arguing that the failure to have forecasted a worst-case possibility such
as the experience of the Great Depression is inevitable since that is assessed ex ante).
151. Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 382. Some investors undoubtedly decided, rationally, to
invest in these securities with the hope of benefiting from the housing market bubble before
it burst.
152. Id. This phenomenon, again, could have been the product of rational choice by
some investors who believed they could break from the herd before the market collapsed.
153. See id. at 384-85.
154. Though not for the originators and fund managers whose compensation was not
clawed back following these losses. Id.
155. See CRAIG K. ELWELL, FINANCIAL MARKET TuRMOIL AND U.S. MACROECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 1 (2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40007_20081203.pdf ("The move toward short-
term lending diminishes the flow of long-term credit to the non-financial economy and
dampens the economic activities of households and businesses that are dependent on bor-
rowing.").
156. See id. at 5 ("After advancing 7.5% in 2006, the pace of spending by businesses on
new plant and equipment slowed to 5.0% in 2007, and through the second quarter of 2008
that pace had slowed to about 2.3%.").
157. See Michael E. Porter, Why America Needs an Economic Strategy, Bus. WK., Nov. 10,
2008, at 39, 40 ("An inadequate rate of reinvestment in science and technology is hamper-
ing America's feeder system for entrepreneurship.").
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and expenditures, there would be no new income-producing as-
sets, and no new innovations, to steam corporate growth. 58 A firm
creates wealth through capital investments or R&D by investing in
new products and new ways to produce or commercialize existing
products and services." 9 But it takes time for these investments to
materialize, since they necessarily involve something new and un-
known.60
The seizing up of the credit markets post-crisis does not alone
explain the decline in capital investments and R&D expenditures.
This is likely also due in part to pressure placed on managers to
forego R&D and capital expenditures as a way to boost corporate
profits.'61 Unless this pressure is alleviated, the trend towards de-
creasing levels of capital investments and R&D may continue,
leading to a decline in innovation and entrepreneurism in the U.S.
The financial crisis also shows the significant social cost of the
failure of numerous large U.S. public companies. Since the start of
the 2008 economic crisis, the U.S. unemployment rate has soared
to 10% (in December 2009) from 5% (in December 2007) .62 And
the trend of an unemployment rate close to 10% seems to be con-
tinuing.
All of these and other adverse consequences of the financial cri-
sis reaffirm the view of the corporation-specifically the public
corporation-as not simply an autonomous, self-contained eco-
nomic unit, but instead as a key member of the economic and
158. SeeWilliam T. Allen & Leo E. Strine,Jr., When the Existing Economic Order Deserves a
Champion: The Enduring Relevance of Martin Lipton's Vision of the Corporate Law, 60 Bus. LAW.
1383, 1388 (2005) ("For [Martin Lipton], social wealth is actually created, not in financial
markets, but within corporations--where research scientists invent products, engineers plan,
and marketing and production people at all levels of the corporation develop and execute
strategies to deliver attractive goods and services efficiently."); Porter, supra note 157.
159. See Houman B. Shadab, Innovation and Corporate Governance: The Impact of Sarbanes-
Oxley, 10 U. PA.J. Bus. & EMP. L. 955, 962 (2008) ("The capability of a firm to create change
through innovation ... is a source of value to the business and its shareholders. For this
reason, successful innovation results in better economic performance ...
160. Seeid. at963.
161. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
162. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION: DECEMBER 2008
(2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_010
9 20 0 9 .htm; Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, Labor Force Statistics From the Current Population Survey, http://data.bls.gov/
PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data tool=latesLnumbers&seriesid=LNS14000000
[hereinafter Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics] (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). From December 2005 to December 2007, the rate had
fluctuated between 4.4% and 5.0%. Id.
163. U.S. Department of Labor statistics show that the unemployment rate since De-
cember 2009 has fluctuated between 9.7 and 9.9. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force
Statistics, supra note 162.
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social fabric of the U.S. economy.'6 Recognizing the impact of the
crisis on U.S. businesses, the economy, and the citizenry, the fed-
eral government has staged the largest cumulative financial
assistance package ever conceived, providing over $2.1 trillion in
capital to U.S. businesses. The terms of the financial assistance
clearly show a policy in favor of U.S. businesses creating sustainable
business models. This is reflected in the compensation provisions
of the EESA and ARRA, 6" as well as in the conditions placed on the
funds made available to GM and Chrysler.167 It is also apparent
from repeated messages delivered by the Obama administration
that U.S. businesses need to be successful in the long-term. '68
In summary, the current financial crisis has shown the ills of cor-
porate short-termism on U.S. businesses as well as on our national
economy and citizenry. Not only did businesses fail to appreciate,
or choose to ignore, risks associated with their investments due to
their short-term profit-induced stupor, but they also failed to pro-
tect themselves from those risks. The collective impact has been
numerous corporate failures, a serious contraction in credit mar-
kets, an alarming decline in employment, and an overall skepticism
as to the strength of the U.S. economy.
That is not to say that corporations, and corporate law, should
be designed to enhance social wealth without regard to financial
164. Berle and Means recognized this to be true over 75 years ago. See BERLE & MEANS,
supra note 12, at 1 (describing the public corporation as a "major social institution"); see also
Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 948, 963
(2008) (arguing that the ultimate goal of corporate law should be to create societal wealth,
broadly defined).
165. Adding Up the Government's Total Bailout Tab, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/02/04/business/20090205-bailout-totals-
graphic.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (stating that
the government has spent $528 billion lending to businesses and $1.6 trillion investing in
businesses). The above amount does not include financial assistance in the form of govern-
ment insurance or tax benefits.
166. See discussion supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
167. Both Congress and the administration set as a condition to financial assistance to
GM and Chrysler that they each present a business plan showing how they could be profit-
able on a sustainable basis. See U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Program Descriptions: Automotive
Industry Financing Program (July 6, 2009), http://financialstability.gov/roadtostability/
programs.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (stating that
the Automotive Industry Financing Program "will require steps be taken by participating
firms to implement plans that achieve long-term viability"). For more detailed information
concerning the Automotive Industry Financing Program, see U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Auto-
motive Industry Financing Program, http://financialstability.gov/roadtostability/
autoprogram.html (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
168. See, e.g., Pres. Barack Obama, Weekly Address of President-elect Barack Obama
(Jan. 3, 2009) (transcript available at http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/american
recoveryandreinvestment/) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form) ("We need an American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan that not only creates jobs in
the short-term but spurs economic growth and competitiveness in the long-term.").
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returns to investors. In fact, if directors ignored or placed a second
priority on stockholders' financial interests, investors would un-
doubtedly be reluctant to part with their money for fear that their
investments would simply be used to create wealth for others in
society. But corporate law, as with other law, reflects a series of pol-
icy choices. 69 Thus the policies that serve as the foundation for our
corporate laws should reflect the reality that the purpose of corpo-
rations is not simply to generate quick wealth for shareholders, but
to generate sustained wealth for shareholders, as well as for our so-
ciety as a whole. As William Allen, former Chancellor of the
Delaware Chancery Court, and Vice Chancellor Strine have keenly
observed on this point, "corporation law itself, in this view [refer-
ring to Martin Lipton's institutionalist view], is seen as but a part of
a larger economic and social policy that sought and seeks to pro-
mote wealth creation, not simply for the benefit of stockholders
and managers, but more generally for the benefit of a nation."170
As a vital component to the creation of durable societal wealth,
corporations must look to being successful in the long-term, to give
their capital investments and innovative projects time to germinate
and yield returns. It is counterproductive to this goal for corpora-
tions to focus primarily on generating profits for their investors on
a quarter-to-quarter or even year-to-year basis.17' Because long-term
wealth creation is a substantial policy concern, corporate laws
should be designed to further that interest and to dissuade corpo-
rate players from pursing counter-productive goals.
The obvious question then becomes: how do we fix our system
so that it achieves the goal of long-term value creation? In my view,
the most sensible place to start is at the board level, as directors are
the hubs that keep the corporate spokes together. More
169. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 193 ("Given the corporation's origins as a
historical and legal construct created for specific public policy reasons, the state naturally
may choose to condition the use of the corporate form upon compliance with rules that
advance societal goals, even if those goals clash with stockholder interests.").
170. Allen & Strine, supra note 158, at 1385; see also Leo E. Strine,Jr., Response, Toward
a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate
America, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1759, 1764 (2006) ("The primary goal of corporate law [under
the traditionalist perspective], therefore, is not to prevent failure at each and every firm to
the fullest extent possible, but to facilitate the maximum creation of durable societal wealth
by all firms."). For an explanation of how business decisions can be made in the interest of
both shareholders and society, see discussion infra Part IV.
171. The many business and investment leaders who met at the Conference Board's
Corporate/Investment summit echoed this sentiment. As their report states, "Undoubtedly,
the health of an economic system depends on its ability to perform well year after year-not
only during the next quarter." TONELLO, supra note 49, at 5; see also Lipton & Rosenblum,
supra note 5, at 192 ("The health and stability of these economies [referring to the econo-
mies of the U.S. and UK] depends on the ability of corporations to maintain healthy and
stable business operations over the long term and to compete in world markets.").
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specifically, directors are charged with overseeing a corporation's
business and affairs."2 In that capacity, they have the duty to make
business decisions and oversee the corporation with the objective
of the corporation achieving its business purpose." Therefore, it
makes sense to implement the corporate objective of long-term
value creation through the board, the primary overseer of corpo-
rate operations and strategy. It is thus to the board that I turn to
next.
III. WHAT IT MEANS FOR DIRECTORS TO ACT IN THE BEST INTEREST
OF THE CORPORATION AND ITS STOCKHOLDERS
As I discuss in Part I, investors in public companies as well as
some executives have reasons to want corporations to generate
profits in the short-term. Part I also explains how those investors
and executives can influence boards to make decisions that are re-
sponsive to their short-term interests. However as I explain in Part
II, managing a corporation for the benefit of those short-term in-
terests is antithetical to the goal of creating sustainable wealth for
individual businesses and for our economy.
This section explains why directors have the freedom to be re-
sponsive to investors' and executives' short-term interests under
their fiduciary duties, even though that runs counter to the inter-
ests of long-term minded investors, other corporate constituents,
and our economy. This discussion focuses on Delaware law, not
only because it is the jurisdiction where the majority of public cor-
porations are incorporated, 7 4 but also because Delaware law is
followed, or looked to for guidance by, courts in other jurisdic-
tions."
75
172. See discussion infra Part III.A.
173. See discussion infra Part III.A. This is true even though the business judgment rule
generally shields directors from liability for decisions that have a rational business purpose
and are made in good faith.
174. See 1 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 93, at 2-3 (finding that a majority of public corpora-
tions are incorporated in Delaware).
175. Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance wiith Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Climate of
Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAMJ. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 397 (2007); see also DennisJ.
Connolly & Bess M. Parrish, Current Issues Involving the Application of Exculpation and the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule to Creditors' Suits Against Directors of Insolvent Corporations, 2006 ANN. SURV.
BANKR. L. 1, 4.
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A. Introduction
Directors oversee the management of the business and affairs of
the corporation on whose board they serve. In this capacity, they
are described as fiduciaries of the corporation and its sharehold-
ers. That means that in exercising their powers, directors must
comply with their fiduciary duties.
In Delaware, directors owe the fiduciary duties of care and loy-
alty.' 79 Under the duty of care, every director must become
informed of all material information reasonably available before
making a business decision. s8 However, due to operation of the
business judgment rule, directors are only liable for failing to
comply with that duty where their failure amounts to gross negli-
gence." And even then they might not be liable if the corporation
has an exculpation charter provision or otherwise agrees to excul-
pate the directors for breaches of the duty of care.82
The duty of loyalty mandates that every director act in good faith
in a manner she reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the
corporation and its shareholders.' Courts typically analyze the
duty of loyalty by explaining how a director violates that duty.'84 As
such, a director breaches her duty of loyalty where she acts in a way
that works injury to the corporation, or she deprives the corpora-
tion of a profit or advantage either that her skills and ability might
bring to the corporation, or that the corporation would make in
the exercise of its powers.
176. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
177. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503,
510 (Del. 1939)).
178. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,360 (Del. 1993).
179. Id. at 367 ("Duty of care and duty of loyalty are the traditional hallmarks of a fidu-
ciary who endeavors to act in the service of a corporation and its stockholders.").
180. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
181. Id. Under the business judgment rule, business decisions are presumed to have
been made in good faith, on an informed basis, and in an honest belief that the action taken
is in the best interest of the corporation. Id. To rebut that presumption, a stockholder must
prove that the board failed to so inform itself, and that failure amounted to gross negli-
gence. Id.
182. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d
1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) ("Our jurisprudence since the adoption of the statute has consis-
tently stood for the proposition that a Section 102(b) (7) charter provision bars a claim that
is found to state only a due care violation."). Corporations can also indemnify directors for
breaches of their duty of care. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145.
183. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 (citing Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del.
1984)).
184. See, e.g., id. at 362 ("Classic examples of director self-interest in a business transac-
tion involve either a director appearing on both sides of a transaction or a director receiving
a personal benefit from a transaction not received by the shareholders generally.").
185. Id. at 361; Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
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Moreover, a director violates her duty of loyalty where she acts in
bad faith.'"" The Delaware Supreme Court has identified at least
three ways in which a director can be found to have acted in bad
faith."7 One way is to consciously disregard her duties.' Bad faith
also exists where a director acts with a subjective intent to harm a
corporation.'89 A third type of bad faith involves a director who acts
carelessly with a higher state of culpability than gross negligence,
though it is not entirely clear exactly what level of culpability is re-
quired. 90
But fiduciary duties are not merely proscriptive, indicating what
conduct a director may not engage in. They also require directors
to affirmatively protect the interests of the corporation committed
to her charge.' 9' This affirmative aspect of fiduciary duties is impor-
tant, for it instructs directors that their business decisions and
oversight responsibilities must be implemented not merely to avoid
breaching a duty of trust to the corporation, but to affirmatively
advance the corporation's purpose.
Delaware court decisions have focused much less on this positive
aspect of fiduciary duties than on their proscriptive aspects. That is
undoubtedly due to the fact that the cases that appear before the
Delaware courts involve sub-par director conduct, where the courts
are asked to determine whether that conduct meets the applicable
standard of liability. Yet it is important to understand exactly what
the affirmative aspect of fiduciary duties requires, for that estab-
lishes what purpose, and for whose benefit, directors must manage
and oversee corporate affairs.
92
186. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006)
(clarifying that the failure to act in good faith results in liability because it is a necessary
condition to compliance with the duty of loyalty).
187. See In reWalt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).
188. Id. at 66-67.
189. Id. at 64.
190. See id at 64-66.
191. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) ("Not only do these principles de-
mand that corporate fiduciaries absolutely refrain from any act which breaches the trust
reposed in them, but also to affirmatively protect and defend those interests entrusted to them." (em-
phasis added)); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) ("[T]he
board's power to act derives from its fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corpo-
rate enterprise, which includes stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived, irrespective
of its source."); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
192. Not undertaking sufficient processes to make informed decisions that further the
corporation's purpose, or perhaps not understanding what the corporation's purpose is,
would seem to be a conscious disregard of a duty, and thus amount to bad faith under the
duty of loyalty. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749-50 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("[Wlhether a judge or jury considering the matter
after the fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending
through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or 'irrational', provides no ground for director liability, so
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It seems particularly important to determine how directors
affirmatively act in the best interest of the corporation and its
stockholders in the current environment, as investors are increas-
ingly placing pressure on boards to make decisions that yield
short-term results and executive compensation arrangements are
driving managers to present information and strategic options to
the board that are unduly focused on short-term profits. By deter-
mining what the corporation's and its stockholders' true interests
are that directors must advance, directors should be able to more
clearly determine whether their decisions and oversight duties are
truly being performed in the best interest of the constituents who
they must protect under their fiduciary duties.
The remaining portion of this Part IV explores how the Dela-
ware courts have interpreted and applied the positive duty to act in
the "best interest of the corporation and its stockholders."
B. Acting in the Best Interest of the Corporation and its Stockholders
In Delaware, courts generally interpret the affirmative duty to
act in the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders as
imposing on directors the duty to advance corporate wealth
through profitability.93 While courts generally state this guiding
principle to be true, they do not provide any consistent explana-
tion as to the basis for it.9 Yet two lines of cases suggest two distinct
rationales for this corporate purpose.
In one line of cases, the Delaware courts have suggested that di-
rectors must make decisions with the sole objective of maximizing
profits because that is what stockholders, the sole residual
long as the court determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in a
good faith effort to advance corporate interests." (quoting In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996))); SeanJ. Griffith, Good Faith BusinessJudgment: A
Theory of Rhetoric in Coporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DuKE L.J. 1, 41-42 (2005) ("The duty of
care, in other words, contains within itself an assumption that the decisionmaker is moti-
vated by the corporation's business purpose."). While the duty of care largely lacks teeth, as
directors can be exculpated for liability arising out of breaches of that duty, directors' failure
to exercise sufficient care may create liability where that failure amounts to bad faith. See
supra notes 182, 186-88 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A-2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989)
("This broad mandate [referring to the board's duty to manage the business and affairs of a
corporation under the Delaware General Corporation Law § 141 (a)] includes a conferred
authority to set a corporate course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance
corporate profitability.").
194. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REv.
163, 171 (2008) (noting that dicta in some cases suggest directors ought to attempt to maxi-
mize shareholder wealth in the long run while dicta in other cases take a broader view of
corporate purpose).
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beneficiaries of the corporation, want.15 Presumably the stream of
logic flows as follows: common shareholders are the residual bene-
ficiaries of a corporation because when a shareholder invests in a
corporation's common stock, that stock entitles the holder to a
proportionate share in the assets of the enterprise after all claims
of debtors and other claimants are satisfied. 196 That means that on
dissolution, shareholders receive the value of a corporation's assets
in excess of its debts. Not surprisingly, the difference between the
value of assets and debts on a corporation's balance sheet (after
taking into account stated capital) is called "shareholders' eq-
uity."' 7 Shareholders' equity grows when the value of assets
increases (without a corresponding increase in debts), which oc-
curs as profits accumulate.'98 Thus the more profits a corporation
earns, the higher its shareholders' equity will be (unless/until
those profits are distributed to shareholders or used in opera-
tions).
Yet by indicating the corporate purpose in terms only of what
shareholders want (profits), some courts have effectively ignored
what the interest of the "corporation" is. The flaw in this construc-
tion, of course, is that Delaware courts consistently pronounce
fiduciary duties as being owed to both shareholders and the corpora-
tion.I9' We must therefore assume that both are intended to be
covered by fiduciary duties. The fact that the inclusion of both the
"corporation" and "stockholders" in fiduciary duties has persisted
for so long and been referred to so pervasively in Delaware court
opinions lends further support to the fact that these bodies are
both intended to be included.2 0
195. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d
92, 101 (Del. 2007) ("The directors of Delaware corporations have the legal responsibility to
manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of its shareholders owners.... [The
shareholders] are the ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation's growth and increased
value." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880,
886 n.7 (Del. 2002).
196. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 281 (2001) (requiring, in dissolution, that all non-
shareholder claimants' claims be paid first, and thereafter "[a]ny remaining assets shall be
distributed to the stockholders of the dissolved corporation"); see also Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601,613 (2006).
197. SeeJOHN G. HELMKAMP ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING 15-16, 659 (3rd ed.
1989); ROGER H. HERMANSON ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: A BusINESS PERSPECTIVE 19
(8th ed. 2002). Though the balance sheet only shows assets' book values, not fair market
values. HELMKAMP ET AL., supra, at 119; HERMANSON ET AL., Supra, at 109.
198. HERMANSON ET AL., supra note 197, at 16-17. Shareholders' equity also grows with
the increase in value of existing assets.
199. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
200. Delaware statutory law also supports the distinction between the corporation and
its stockholders. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 121 (describing a corporation's general
powers and distinguishing the corporation from its officers, directors, and stockholders).
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Perhaps these courts only look at the interest of stockholders in
assessing to whom fiduciary duties are owed as only stockholders
have the right to enforce fiduciary duties against directors.' Yet
that does not mean that directors do not owe the corporation
these duties. Rather, it may mean that stockholders generally rep-
resent the interests of all constituents in the context of derivative
suits against directors-thus there is no need for other constituents
to also have standing to bring derivative suits. 20 2 This may be par-
ticularly true considering the potential cost of empowering all
constituents to bring derivative suits. Or it may reveal an aspira-
tional aspect of fiduciary duties, where the standard of conduct
that courts want boards to achieve (that directors act in the best
interest of the corporation, including all of its constituents) varies
from the standard of review (that directors will only be held liable
for breaches where their conduct adversely impacts stockhold-
ers) .205 Yet perhaps courts in this line of cases do not separately
analyze (or mention) the duty owed to the corporation because
they believe the interests of the corporation and its stockholders
are exactly the same.
In the other line of cases, the Delaware courts have recognized
that the corporation's interest is a unique component of fiduciary
duties and have authorized the board to consider that interest
separately from the interest of stockholders. 4 In those cases, the
courts have typically presumed that the corporation's interest, like
The fact that the corporation is distinct from its shareholders also necessarily follows from
the fact that key characteristics of the corporation-including its legal personality, perma-
nent existence, limited liability, entity-level taxation, and centralized management-all flow
from its separateness. Greenwood, supra note 128, at 126. This distinction is also apparent
from the corporate veil that exists between the corporation and its shareholders, freeing
shareholders from corporate liabilities in most circumstances. See id.
201. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101
(Del. 2007). Though upon a corporation becoming insolvent, its creditors, too, may enforce
the directors' fiduciary duties. Id.
202. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role
of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 427 (2001) ("[C]areful inspection of the sub-
stantive nature of directors' fiduciary duties reveals that shareholders can only bring a
successful derivative suit in circumstances where directors act in a fashion that hurts not just
shareholders, but other residual claimants as well.").
203. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 130, at 1416 (explaining the difference be-
tween a standard of conduct, which is an aspirational standard for what is expected of
directors, and a standard of review, which governs whether a director will be held liable).
The classic example of the aspirational aspect of fiduciary duties is the duty of care, where
directors aspire to become informed of all information reasonably available before making
decisions yet are not liable unless their failure to do so amounts to gross negligence.
204. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-56 (Del. 1985)
(authorizing the board to consider shareholder and non-shareholder interests at stake in
considering whether the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders requires direc-
tors to pursue a takeover bid).
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stockholders' interest, is in corporate profitability.205 Yet they gen-
erally have made this assumption without any analysis as to what
the corporation's interest is or why it is in profitability. Thus the
presumption underlying these decisions, like the cases discussed
above, seems to be that board decisions designed to enhance cor-
porate profitability are in the interests of both the corporation and
its stockholders. 06
Still, the Delaware courts have on occasion suggested that the in-
terest of the corporation may differ from the interest of
stockholders, at least in the takeover context.0 7 Unocal, decided in
1985, involved a challenged Unocal board decision to offer to re-
purchase Unocal stock for cash as a defensive measure, to prevent
Unocal stockholders from tendering shares to Mesa pursuant to its
two-tiered coercive tender offer.0 In that case, the Delaware Su-
preme Court held that the Unocal board had a "fundamental duty
and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes
stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived."' '0 This language,
as well as other consistent language in this opinion, shows that the
court viewed the interest of stockholders as simply one component
of the interest of the corporation. Moreover, the court authorized
the board, in evaluating Unocal's interest, to consider the interests
of its constituencies other than shareholders and referred specifi-
cally to the interests of creditors, customers, employees, and the
community for this purpose. 2 ' 0 This suggests that the interests of
non-stockholder constituents might differ from the interests of
stockholders, for if they were the same, there would be no need to
authorize the board to consider them independently. Still, the
court did not indicate what the interests of these constituencies
205. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989)
("This broad mandate [referring to the board's authority to manage a corporation's busi-
ness and affairs under title 8, section 141(a) of the Delaware Code] includes a conferred
authority to set a corporate course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance
corporate profitability."); TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427 & 10298,
1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (indicating that the board, outside of Revlon
mode, has a duty to the corporation and its shareholders to seek long-term values).
206. Still, some of these decisions suggest that the corporation's and stockholders' in-
terests in profitability are only aligned in the long-term. See, e.g., TWServices, 1989 WL 20290,
at *7 ("1 take it as non-controversial that, under established and conventional conceptions,
directors owe duties of loyalty to the corporation and to the shareholders; that this conjunc-
tive expression is not usually problematic because the interests of shareholders as a class are
seen as congruent with those of the corporation in the long run ...
207. See, e.g., Unocal 493 A2d at 946, 949-51.
208. See id. at 949-51.
209. Id. at 954 (emphasis added); see Stout, supra note 194, at 170 (arguing that this lan-
gnage shows that the corporation and stockholders are not the same under the duty of
loyalty).
210. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
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were and instead deferred to the board to make that determina-
tion.
Moreover, the court in Unocal did not indicate that the board
could place the interests of non-shareholder constituents abov--or
even on equal footing to-the interests of stockholders. And in fact
the court subsequently indicated in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc. that the board can only consider the interests
of non-stockholder constituents so long as they are "rationally re-
lated" to the interests of stockholders in profit maximization.
While this statement in Revlon was likely dicta, subsequent cases
citing to this proposition from Revlon indicates judicial support for
it, even where a corporation is not in "Revlon" mode.1 4
Nor was the board in Unocal or in the other discussed cases re-
quired to consider non-shareholders' interests. At most, the courts
simply permitted the boards to consider those interests. While the
courts have not explained why this consideration is only permissive
despite the fact that fiduciary duties seemingly require a considera-
tion of the corporation's interest as well as stockholders' interest,
logic and intuition suggest that it is due to the fact that the dis-
cussed cases were decided in the takeover context. In that context,
the interest of stockholders is most likely to diverge from the inter-
est of other corporate constituents, for the former would be
expected to favor any takeover proposal that promised proceeds in
211. See id.
212. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (referring to Unocal for the proposition that a board
may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities under Unocal,
provided there are "rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders").
213. The statement was likely dicta as the holding in Revlon applies only where the sale
of control of a corporation is inevitable (and thus the board may not consider the interests
of non-stockholders).
214. See, e.g., In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 999 n.32 (Del. Ch.
2005) (indicating that the portion of the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Revlon re-
stricting directors to consider non-shareholder constituencies' interests only where those
interests are rationally related to some benefit to stockholders tempered language in Unoca4
but also suggesting that this limitation only applies in the context of a decision to sell a
company under Revlon). The notion that the interests of the stockholders are primary, and
the interests of other constituents secondary, can be traced back to as early as 1919, when
the Michigan Supreme Court decided Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). In
that case, the Michigan Supreme Court held that "[a] business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders." Id. at 684 (emphasis added); see Stout,
supra note 194, at 165 (arguing that Dodge v. Ford is routinely employed as the only legal
authority for the proposition that corporate law requires corporations to have a legal duty to
put shareholders' interests above all others). But seeJonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an
Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 177, 178-79 (2008) (noting that
the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance are consistent with Dodge v.
Ford's core lesson that corporate officers and directors have a duty to manage the corpora-
tion for the purpose of maximizing profits for the benefit of shareholders, and arguing that
profit maximization is only a default rule).
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excess of investors' perceived intrinsic values, while the latter
would likely disfavor any proposal that meant discontinuance of
the firm. ' Perhaps for similar reasons, the courts in the discussed
takeover cases did not require that the boards fix any particular
time period for achievement of the corporate purpose. 6 Again,
this is likely due to the fact that in the takeover context, the board
is faced with the decision of whether or not to abandon the corpo-
ration's long-term strategy in favor of a short-term sale. Thus the
takeover context seems to necessitate a broad conferral of discre-
tion on the board as to the interests to be considered and
corporate purpose to be achieved.
If this is indeed the rationale for this broad conferral of discre-
tion on the board, then we might expect to see judicial guidance
indicating that outside of the takeover context, boards must con-
sider the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders in
the long-term in discharging its fiduciary duties, for there would be
no competing short-term option. Indeed a number of courts have
suggested a judicial preference for directors to manage for the
long-term. 17 Yet they generally do not require it.21 Thus absent a
takeover, courts still defer to the board to decide the time period
over which the goal of profitability is to be achieved. 21 9 That means
that the board must decide whether to achieve the goal of profit-
ability over a six-month period, year period, five year period, or
215. See discussion infra Part IV.
216. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989)
("[T]he question of 'long-term' versus 'short-term' values is largely irrelevant because direc-
tors, generally, are obliged to chart a course for a corporation which is in its best interests
without regard to a fixed investment horizon.").
217. See, e.g., TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427 & 10298, 1989 WL
20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) ("[D]irectors, in managing the business and affairs of
the corporation, may find it prudent (and are authorized) to make decisions that are ex-
pected to promote corporate (and shareholder) long run interests, even if short run share
value can be expected to be negatively affected ... ."). Other academics have also observed
that the Delaware courts seem to favor the long-term. See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kra-
akman, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Searchfor Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 521,
527 (2002) (inferring from Revlon that directors should seek to maximize long-term share-
holder value where a corporation is not in Revlon mode).
218. But see Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("It is the obliga-
tion of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the
corporation's stockholders .... ").
219. See, e.g., Hahn v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 1987 WL 18429, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 1987)
("While reasonable men may disagree as to whether long-term growth objectives should
prevail over short-term profit considerations, the decision to pursue a long range objective is
a business decision subject to a presumption of propriety under the business judgment
rule.").
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some other time period, so long as that time period is justifiable
under the corporation's business plan.220
But this lack of judicial guidance absent a takeover proposal
would seem to permit directors to make decisions that are primar-
ily aimed at generating short-term profits, even where that comes
at the expense of long-term profitability to the detriment of long-
term shareholders and other corporate constituents. Normatively,
then, we must ask-should directors have this absolute discretion
where no takeover proposal is pending, or should fiduciary duty
law require directors to manage corporations in that context for the
long-term? For some, the answer to this question depends on
whether the interests of shareholders and the corporation are in
fact aligned in the long-term, as so often is presumed to be true.
For if they are indeed aligned in the long-term, then the board
could discharge this duty to both stockholders and non-
stockholders simultaneously. It is to this point that I turn to next.
IV. THE INTERESTS OF THE CORPORATION AND ITS STOCKHOLDERS
ARE ALIGNED IN THE LONG-TERM
As Part III reveals, under existing fiduciary duty law, directors
may make business decisions that are designed to yield short-term
profits, even if that comes at the expense of long-term profitability.
That is because Delaware fiduciary duty confers on directors dis-
cretion to decide the time horizon for achievement of the
corporate purpose of profitability. Yet some Delaware jurists have
indicated that directors should manage for the long-term.22' As is
discussed in Part III, this seems to be based, at least in part, on
their assumption that in the long-term, stockholders' and non-
stockholders' interests are aligned.222 In this Part IV, I analyze
whether the interests of stockholders and non-stockholders are
indeed aligned in the long-term. I begin by analyzing the interests
of stockholders (Section A) and then turn to the interests of the
corporation, represented, in addition to stockholders, by its non-
stockholder constituents (Section B).
220. See Paramount Commc'ns Inc., 571 A.2d at 1154 ("Directors are not obliged to aban-
don a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there
is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.").
221. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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A. Stockholders' Interest In Long-Term Profitability
As is discussed in Part III, stockholders are considered to be re-
sidual beneficiaries. That means that on dissolution, they receive
224the value of a corporation's assets in excess of its liabilities. A cor-
poration's assets grow with the accumulation of corporate profits.5
Thus shareholders clearly have an interest in a corporation's prof-
itability.226 Stockholders' receipt of periodic dividends also explains
their interest in profitability, for dividends are generally paid out of
a corporation's profits.227 The more profits a corporation generates,
the greater the likelihood that those profits will be in excess of
what the company needs to operate and will be distributed to
'228stockholders.
But do investors have an interest in a firm's long-term profitabil-
ity? If the efficient capital market hypothesis were true, then
certainly investors would want a corporation to generate profits on
a sustained basis, for that would mean the corporation would be
generating cash flows into the future, thereby leading to a high
intrinsic value calculated from those cash flows. 22 But as I argue in
Part I.A., investors have reasons to want profits to be generated in
the short-term even where that might impair long-term profitabil-
ity, given the short-term bias inherent in stock prices resulting from
information imperfections, as well as investor behavioral deviations
from rationality.2s Still, some investors-particularly those who
hold their shares for a longer period of time-are less interested in
short-term spikes in stock prices, for they do not trade their shares
223. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
226. This may not be true for investors who have hedged away their economic interest.
The interests of those investors will be ignored for purposes of this analysis, not because they
do not exist, but because there are clear policy reasons why corporations should not be
managed with their interests in mind.
227. 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 362 (2007) ("As a general rule, dividends can be declared
and paid out of net profits only ... ."). While dividends are typically declared and paid out
of profits, in Delaware they may be declared even where a corporation does not have profits
out of a corporation's surplus. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2001). Surplus generally
refers to the amount by which a corporation's net assets (its assets minus its liabilities) ex-
ceed the amount determined by the board to constitute "capital." See id. at § 154. Generally
"capital" is at least equal to the number of shares issued in all subscriptions multiplied by
those shares' par values. See id.
228. While the fact that a corporation has generated a high level of profits increases the
chances that the board will pay those profits out as dividends, it does not mean that a board
is obligated to do so. In fact, boards are not required to pay dividends except where the
failure to do so amounts to an abuse of discretion. Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett Group Inc., 479
A.2d 276, 280 (Del. 1984) (citing Eshleman v. Keenan, 194 A. 40, 43 (Del. Ch. 1937)).
229. See discussion supra Part I.A.
230. See discussion supra Part IA.
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in the short-term to capitalize on those price fluctuations. 23 ' Those
investors, in contrast, likely calculate firms' intrinsic values in a way
that is more reflective of the long-term. Moreover, significant insti-
tutional investors often take a long-term view to their investments
out of necessity, for they inevitably will, on repeated occasions,
hold stock in the same firms.32 Thus it seems investors may diverge
in the period over which they seek corporate profitability.
233
Delaware courts recognize that not all shareholders have the
same interests.234 And they have authorized the board to favor the
interests of long-term shareholders over short-term, speculative
shareholders where a corporation is not "for sale" under Revlon.22'
Perhaps that is because they believe long-term investors' interests
are more reflective of "shareholders' interests" under the fiduciary
duty analysis, given that those investors' investment decisions more
truly reflect corporations' intrinsic values.236 Consistent with that
view, "shareholders' interest" would be in the generation of sus-
tainable profits, for that would lead to the highest potential pay-out
to shareholders.
B. The Corporation's Interest in Long-Term Profitability
We must first identify who the corporation is before we can de-
termine whether the "corporation" has an interest in long-term
profitability. Guidance on this emerges from Unocal, where the
Delaware Supreme Court appears to have held that the corpora-
tion's interest is represented by the interests of its various
231. See discussion supra Part I.A.
232. See discussion supra Part I.A.
233. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 6, at 1283-92 (arguing that investors have dispa-
rate interests, including as to investment horizon).
234. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386 (Del. 1995) (citing Para-
mount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45-46 (Del. 1994)); Nixon v.
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) ("It is well established in our jurisprudence that
stockholders need not always be treated equally for all purposes."). In fact, this aspect of
fiduciary duty law also seems to have been accepted by the Delaware legislature through its
passage of an anti-takeover statute which limits certain rights only of a tender offerors but
not other stockholders. SeeDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2001).
235. See, e.g., TW Services, Inc. v. SWTF Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427 & 10298, 1989 WL
20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989). A number of academics also support managing for the
long-term. See, e.g., Velasco, supra note 92, at 454 (arguing that social responsibility theory
has persuaded much of society that many conflicts between shareholder and non-
shareholders arise only from a short-term perspective and their interests may merge in a
long-term perspective because of the benefits of harmonious and productive relationships).
236. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (indicating that Delaware courts under-
stand that the stock market may be inefficient in failing to reflect the long-term value of a
corporation).
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constituents. 2 3 7 The court in that case also identified the types of
constituents (in addition to shareholders) that boards may con-
sider when assessing the interest of the corporation, specifying
creditors, customers, employees, and the community.238 While the
Court indicated that this was a non-exclusive listing, these seem to
be the most commonly identified non-shareholder corporate con-
stituents. 2 9 Thus the following analysis will look to these
constituents to identify whether they are interested in long-term
profitability.
1. Creditors
Creditors of a corporation are persons to whom the corporation
owes money or other property.240 Creditors are typically thought of
as being either trade creditors, to whom the corporation owes
money in connection with its purchase of goods and services, or
borrowed money creditors, from whom the corporation borrows
241money for its operations.
It seems clear that a creditor's primary interest is for a corpora-
tion to be able to repay its debts to the creditor as they become
due.4 2 That means that every creditor wants the corporation to be
financially successful, at least over the term of the debt, to be able
to repay the debt according to its terms. In fact the more profitable
a corporation is, the less any creditor has to worry about a potential
risk of the corporation not being able to repay its debts to the
creditor and other potentially senior and pari passu creditors.
Moreover, both types of creditors would likely also want a corpora-
tion to grow so that it would either need to buy larger amounts of
237. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting, as
the second element of the standard of proof for board adoption of defensive measures to a
takeover offer, a balancing of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise,
and for purposes of weighing the interest of the corporate enterprise, authorizing the board
to consider the impact on constituencies other than shareholders).
238. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
239. See, e.g., Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 287 (Del. Ch.
1989) (adopting the listing of non-shareholder constituents set forth in Unocal); see also Eric
W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
14, 16 (1992) (noting these as the constituents typically identified by state constituency stat-
utes).
240. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 424 (9th ed. 2009).
241. See Irving A. Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dis-
missal on the Basis of "Substantial Abuse, "5J.L. & CoM. 1, 87 (1984) ("Businesses, whether in
the form of sole proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations, generally contemplate and
depend on sustained relationships with trade creditors and commercial lenders....").
242. See Adam Feibelman, Commercial Lending and the Separation of Banking and Commerce,
75 U. CIN. L. REv. 943,948 (2007).
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goods and services on credit, in the case of trade creditors, or bor-
row larger sums, thereby generating higher interest income, in the
case of borrowed money creditors. 43 Thus creditors indeed seem to
be primarily interested in sustained corporate profitability.
2"4
2. Customers
Customers are primarily interested in obtaining quality products
and services at low prices. Repeat customers, or customers who
tend to buy the same products and services from the same suppli-
ers, undoubtedly want a corporation that they buy those goods and
services from to continue to exist so that it continues to supply
them with quality goods and services.245 That means that they in-
herently want a corporation to be profitable so that its continued
existence is justified. A corporation that is profitable is also more
likely to reinvest those profits in new and improved products and
services, which also runs to the benefit of repeat as well as single-
time customers.
Moreover, to the extent that a corporation's products come with
a warranty, customers undoubtedly want the corporation to remain
in business and have profits, at least so that the corporation has
assets beyond its senior liabilities to satisfy its warranty obligations
to the customers.
Thus all customers would seem to desire a corporation that to
some extent is profitable on a sustainable basis. Still, customers are
not necessarily interested in a corporation maximizing its profits, as
that likely means that the profits came at their expense through
high prices paid on consumed products and services. Thus cus-
tomers, like creditors, would likely favor a corporation to be
profitable on a sustained basis, but would likely favor a lower level
of profitability than creditors, at least to the extent profits came at
their expense.
243. Id. at 948-49 (noting that a creditor, like an equity investor, may expect indirect
gains from its investment, including the benefit of future investment relationships).
244. This is true despite the fact that creditor and stockholders likely have different tol-
erances for risk, particularly in the zone of insolvency. See Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT
Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790 n.57 (Del. Ch. 2004). Yet as the Delaware Chancery Court
has pointed out, even in that context, both stockholders and creditors are interested in
increasing the economic value of the firm. Id. at 792.
245. This reduces transaction costs of having to repeatedly research new suppliers.
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3. Employees
Employees are primarily concerned with maintaining their jobs
and getting good compensation and other benefits over the course
of that employment. In addition, employees undoubtedly seek to
obtain intangible benefits from their jobs, such as praise and en-
hanced knowledge. This, in turn, means that employees generally
want a corporation to be financially successful and to continue in
existence, so that it may continue to serve as an employer and pro-
vider of those benefits. In fact, employees would be expected to
want a corporation to be highly profitable, as some portion of
those profits would likely trickle down to them. That would be es-
pecially true for employees who have a portion of their
compensation tied to the corporation's success, whether through a
cash bonus plan, stock option plan, or other plan tied to the firm's
success. Moreover, to the extent that a corporation views itself as a
value-creating enterprise in the long-term, it would be expected to
treat its employees better, investing more resources in their educa-
tion, health, and safety to yield returns over the long-term. 46 That
is not to say that just because an employer is successful on a con-
tinuing basis, every employee will retain her job and receive good
benefits-there are a number of other reasons, such as job per-
formance, that factor into an employee's compensation and
retention. However it seems intuitive that an employer is much
more likely to pay better benefits and retain employees when it is
continuing on a long-term path of profitability. Thus it seems clear
that employees would also seem to want a corporation to be profit-
able on a sustainable basis. 47
Still, some employees who receive a high level of compensation
based on short-term profits would likely be willing to forego some
level of future profits, and risk corporate longevity, in exchange for
short-term profits. 24" That is not to say that they are not interested
in future profits-but simply that they would likely support deci-
246. See Sanford M. Jacoby, The Future of Labor and Finance, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J.
111, 116 (2008) ("When shareholders and business strategies are guided by long-term con-
siderations, they will, allegedly, encourage the treatment of employees not a [sic] cost but as
an asset deserving of training, job security, and fair treatment that promotes low turnover
and high productivity. A focus on the long-term also encourages companies to pay attention
to future liabilities in areas such as employment regulation ....").
247. This proposition may not be as true for independent contractors, which are in-
creasingly used by firms to avoid having to pay unemployment and other benefits. See
Stephen F. Befort, The Regulatory Void of Contingent Work, 10 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 235,
246 (2006). Still, even independent contractors would likely be able to obtain more attrac-
tive compensation packages and other benefits from, and be retained on a more consistent
basis by, a firm that was profitable on a sustainable basis.
248. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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sions that lead to profits in the near term rather than sustained
profits over the long-term given the large size of their pay package,
the time value of money, and the uncertainty of future profits and
continued employment. 49 Yet it seems unreasonable for any em-
ployee to expect to be compensated for short-term profits that
either derive from accounting manipulations or from decisions
that do not properly reflect the risks inherent in them. This is ap-
parent from the many public tongue-lashings received by
executives in the midst of the financial crisis whose compensation
was high despite large firm losses2 50 as well as from the number of
investor and policy-maker calls for reform of this pay practice.
2 5
Thus while we cannot conclude that this entire class of constituent
favors long-term profitability, the executive compensation move-
ment suggests that we discount those interests created by inflated,
short-term compensation arrangements.
4. Community
Identifying who makes up the community where a corporation
operates is no simple task, for that undoubtedly depends on the
nature of the business and where it is located.2 2 But as a general
matter, individuals who live where a corporation conducts its op-
erations presumably want a corporation to contribute as much
economically to the community as possible. This includes, perhaps
first and foremost, paying taxes year after year so that the commu-
nity can consistently count on, and use, those tax revenues for local
services and civic projects. It also means consistently supplying
249. This is similar to the conflict between long-term stockholders and short-term stock-
holders.
250. See e.g., Louise Story, Wall St. Profits Were a Mirage, but Huge Bonuses Were Real, N.Y.
TiMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at Al (noting the enormous size of the 2006 bonuses Merrill Lynch
paid to its CEO and traders, even though Merrill's earnings for that year turned out to be a
mirage and noting criticism of pay practices which awarded large bonuses based on ephem-
eral earnings).
251. See discussion supra Part I.C.
252. State constituency statutes, as well as academic commentary, suggest that the rele-
vant community to consider is that where the corporation operates. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:6-1 (2) (b) (West 2003) (indicating that in making business decisions, the board may
consider "the effects of the action on the community in which the corporation operates" (em-
phasis added)); N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAW § 717(b)(2) (McKinney 2003) (indicating that in
making business decisions, the board may consider, among other things, the communities
in which the corporation does business); Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder
Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1156, 1172 (1993) (analyzing what the community's interest is
by reference to the community where the corporation's plant or office is located).
253. See Ryan J. York, Comment, Visages qf Janus: The Heavy Burden of Other Constituency
Anti-Takeover Statutes on Shareholders and the Efficient Market for Corporate Control, 38
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good jobs so that local individuals can make a living and communi-
ties can consistently maintain their citizenry and tax-paying base. 54
Both of these occur where a corporation is profitable on a sus-
tained basis, for only then will it be able to continue to supply local
jobs. Obviously the more profitable a corporation is, the higher the
amount of taxes it pays, thereby contributing more resources to the
community for local services and civic projects.
To be sure, some "community" constituents might not be inter-
ested in a corporation's profitability. For instance, environmental
groups would want a corporation to shut down its operations that
have an adverse impact on the environment, regardless of the im-
pact of that move on the corporation's profits.2 55 But it would seem
to undermine the exercise of determining the community's inter-
est if we focused on the interests of the few exceptional interest
groups rather than the larger community of interests who fit within
this constituency class. Moreover, by focusing on those who live
where the corporation operates, it seems legislatures that have
adopted constituency statutes have decided to focus on the com-
munity interests identified above rather than on more general or
global interests.
C. Summary
As the foregoing discussion shows, shareholders want a corpora-
tion to be profitable. While some shareholders would prefer that
those profits be realized in the short-term, shareholders who are
less influenced by market imperfections causing a short-term bias
undoubtedly seek a corporation to generate profits on a sustain-
able basis. It is this class of shareholders that courts expressly
authorize boards to prefer when analyzing whether board decisions
were in fact in the best interest of shareholders. In any case, even
for short-term shareholders, it would certainly be in their interest for
a corporation to be profitable in the long-term, even if they have
specious reasons to favor short-term profits.
Moreover, non-shareholders generally also want corporations to
be profitable in the long-term, for those corporations are most able
and apt to compensate their employees well over time and provide
WILLAMEImE L. REV. 187, 197 (2002) (identifying as the community's only identifiable in-
terests the payment of taxes and the supply of local jobs).
254. Id.
255. Yet they, too, might want a corporation to generate profits, if the corporation
would use those profits to not only remediate the corporation's adverse impacts on the envi-
ronment, but to actually improve the condition of the environment.
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other employee benefits. They can also satisfy their warranty obli-
gations owed to customers and continue to supply customers with
new and improved products and services. Profitable corporations
have more resources with which to repay creditors, and if they are
profitable on a sustainable basis, may provide creditors with addi-
tional lending opportunities. Needless to say, corporations with
sustainable profits continuously pay higher taxes and employ more
local people, which benefits the citizens who live in the communi-
ties where those taxes are paid and jobs are made available.
V. REFORMULATING FIDUCIARY DUTIES So THAT THEY REQUIRE
DIRECTORS TO ACT IN THE LONG-TERM BEST INTEREST OF
THE STOCKHOLDERS AND THE CORPORATION
As is discussed in Part IV, by and large all of a corporation's con-
stituencies-shareholders and non-shareholders alike-seem to
share some commonality of interest-they all seek a corporation
that is profitable on a sustained basis. In fact a number of Delaware
courts have recognized this coincidence of interests on profitability
over the long-term. Moreover, Section II provides a strong policy
argument in favor of supporting corporations that are managed to
generate wealth for the good of investors and society in the long-
term. Yet as the discussion in Part III reveals, Delaware courts give
boards wide discretion to decide over what time period a corpora-
tion should be managed for the purpose of generating profits.
Consistently, outside of the Revlon sale context, they also give
boards wide discretion to decide whether to consider non-
stockholders' interests in making business decisions. However, be-
cause of this discretion, directors are more susceptible to influence
by interest groups such as short-term investors and executives, who
benefit from decisions that yield short-term profits.
Given what seems to be a strong policy in favor of managing for
the long-term, and the fact that corporate law reflects policy,256 I
believe corporate law should implement that policy through fidu-
ciary duties. My proposal for doing so is set out in Section A.
Section A also explains why I propose implementing this long-term
agenda through fiduciary duties as well as how this proposal would
effectively be implemented. Then in Section B I set out and re-
spond to a number of likely critiques.
256. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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A. My Proposal
To implement the strong public policy in favor of corporations
that are managed for the long-term, as well as the general coinci-
dence of corporate interest in the long-term, I propose that
directors be required to make decisions primarily for the purpose of
advancing the long-term best interest of the corporation and its
stockholders. That means that every time the board is faced with a
business decision, it would need to consider how that would bene-
fit the corporation and the stockholders in the long-term, and
make decisions that are aimed at achieving that objective. In effect
that would mean that directors would need to determine how every
business decision implemented the corporation's business plan, for
the business plan sets out the corporation's long-term objectives as
257well as strategies to achieve those objectives. That would not
mean that the board must shape corporate strategy such that a cor-
poration foregoes all opportunities to make current profits-but it
would mean that realizing on current profits could not undermine
the corporation's ability to generate profits in the future in accor-
dance with its business plan.
Under my proposal, board decisions would continue to be pro-
tected by the business judgment rule.258 That would mean that
directors would continue to be protected in deciding how to
achieve long-term profitability under the business plan, as well as
how to allocate profits among the various corporate constituents.
But clarifying that fiduciary duties are mandatorily long-term in
nature outside of the takeover context would force directors to
conduct analyses (in compliance with their duty of care) that
would enable them to decide whether each business decision
would be primarily beneficial to the corporation and the stock-
holders in the long-term-and their failure to do so could amount
to a conscious disregard of their duties and thus an act in bad faith.
This, then, could lead to a breach of the duty of loyalty.259 That
would likely mean that directors would have to increasingly con-
sider non-financial factors in making decisions, for the long-term
often cannot be summed up in a neat financial calculation.2 60 But
257. This proposal is similar to one component of a proposal made by Professor John
Matheson and Brent Olson over 15 years ago. See infra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 181 and accompanying text for a discussion of the business judg-
ment rule.
259. See supra Part III for a discussion of how a conscious disregard of duties can lead
to liability for a breach of the duty of loyalty.
260. See supra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of the limits of financial statements to capture
a firm's performance.
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the challenge of valuing the long-term effects of corporate deci-
sions should not preclude their primary importance.
Because this reformulated duty would only require directors to
primarily act in the long-term best interest of stockholders and the
corporation, directors could, in compliance with this duty, consider
the interests of short-term stockholders in making business deci-
sions. This would give directors some flexibility in making business
decisions that are intended to deliver short-term profits. However,
it would not permit them to place those short-term interests above,
or even on par with, the interests of stockholders and other corpo-
rate constituents in sustained corporate profitability. Because
stockholder and non-stockholder constituents' interests converge
in the long-term, this interpretation would also seem to more faith-
fully implement the long-standing construction of directors'
fiduciary duties, which require that directors consider the interests
of stockholders as well as the interest of the corporation.
One may ask why the board-rather than some other constitu-
ent-should as an initial matter be charged with implementing the
corporate purpose of long-term profitability. For one, the board is
the body that oversees adoption and implementation of a corpora-
tion's business plan. The business plan is the source of the
corporation's long-term profit-making strategy. Thus it makes sense
for the board to be charged with implementing the corporate pur-
pose through its oversight of the business planning process. The
fact that boards are generally comprised of highly respected and
knowledgeable businessmen and women would only make discus-
sions about long-term profit-making strategies more meaningful.61
Moreover, the board is already charged with the duty to act in the
best interest of the corporation and its stockholders under its fidu-
ciary duties. To the extent that any constraints are imposed on
what amounts to the best interest of the corporation and stock-
holders, they would necessarily need to be reflected through a
modification to those fiduciary duties. And this proposal would be
consistent with the notion from Revlon that any temporal limit on
directors' discretion in making business decisions should be im-
posed on directors through their fiduciary duties.
A related question pertains to why the common law of fiduciary
duties-rather than legislation-is the appropriate means to im-
plement a long-term corporate agenda. Initially it is important to
261. See also Greenfield, supra note 164, at 957 (referring to literature which finds that
the benefits of group decision-making are significant and that groups in many cases outper-
form individuals, and noting that the corporate structure takes advantage of this through
placing the board as decision-maker at the top).
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note that my proposal does not purport to "fix" in its entirety the
"problem" of short-termism. There are undoubtedly complemen-
tary steps that could-and should-be taken to shift the focus of
corporations towards long-term profitability. But my proposal is
intended to be the first guiding step down that path, for it would
seem backwards to implement a long-term policy objective through
specific legislative or regulatory changes before that policy objec-
tive is manifested through corporate governance standards. 2
Moreover, given the limitless ways in which corporations can
achieve long-term profitability in light of their unique business
structures and strategies, it seems to make sense to use, at least as
an initial matter, the standards-based approach offered by fiduciary
duties to implement the long-term mandate rather than a nar-
rower, rules-based approach typically associated with legislation."'
This change would also ensure that state law regulating internal
affairs remains relevant in the current environment of short-term
investor activism. However, once my proposal is implemented, in
my view it would then make sense to consider targeted ways-for
example through tax incentives or penalties, new disclosure rules,
or changes to the corporate voting mechanism-to implement the
then clear corporate objective of generating sustainable profits, at
all times being sensitive to the welcome differences between corpo-
rations and the ways in which they may achieve that objective.
This reinterpretation of the corporate purpose would also pro-
vide directors with much-needed guidance as to how to discharge
their fiduciary duties, particularly in an era where they are faced
262. To some extent, this is already happening with respect to compensation. In that
context, the federal government and regulatory agencies are issuing a patchwork of rules
and regulations designed to curb compensation practices that reward executives and others
for short-term profit-making activities that compromise long-term profitability. See supra
notes 135-43 and accompanying text. In my view, it would make much more sense if these
efforts followed a shift in corporate governance standards reflecting the corporate policy of
long-term profitability, such that these regulations were simply implementing a corporate
mandate pertaining to corporations' internal affairs. That would not only provide a more
coherent framework by which corporations would be operated (rather than specific legisla-
tion targeted at one aspect of short-termism), but it would also guide legislators in designing
legislation aimed at furthering that purpose. Understandably, in the current environment,
legislators felt compelled to do something to curb lavish pay packages at financial institu-
tions despite poor long-term results. However, in my view, before Congress and regulatory
agencies head too far in the direction of detailed regulation to address specific manifesta-
tions of short-termism, Delaware courts should take the opportunity to clarify what is the
object of each director's fiduciary's duties-of producing sustainable profits for the benefit of
the corporation and its shareholders. That, then, can serve as a guide not only to sharehold-
ers in enforcing directors' fiduciary duties, but also to legislators and regulators in
developing necessary laws and regulations that seek to further that purpose.
263. In addition, in Delaware, fiduciary duties are a matter of common law, so it would
not make sense to impose a limit on directors' duties through state legislation.
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with pressures from executives as well as from investors to make
decisions that generate short-term profits. As the Delaware Su-
preme Court has acknowledged, one of the objectives of Delaware
fiduciary duty law is to provide directors with "clear signal beacons
and brightly lined-channel markers as they navigate with due care,
good faith, and loyalty on behalf of a Delaware corporation and its
shareholders."2" This proposal would in fact provide some clarity as
to what corporate purposes directors must seek to achieve. This, in
turn, should enhance accountability of directors to shareholders,
for removing an element of discretion from the board gives share-
holders a more clearly defined standard to which to hold directors
accountable. And since the reformulated duty would lead directors
to act in the interest of both shareholders and the corporation,
shareholders (at least long-term shareholders) would indeed serve
as a proxy for the corporation in enforcing this duty, for doing so
would be in the interest of both.
Still, this reformulation of fiduciary duties would not apply in all
contexts. Specifically, because the reformulated duty would require
directors to consider how to maximize profits under the corpora-
tion's long-term strategy, it would not apply in the context where
the board was faced with a potential takeover or other similar sale
transaction in which the future of the corporation was being ques-
tioned. 65 Indeed it is in that context that the board is deciding the
very question of whether or not to scrap the corporation's long-
term strategy in favor of a sale. 66 Thus in that context it makes
sense to continue to permit directors to consider not only the long-
term interests of stockholders and the corporation, but also their
short-term interests. Again, this might explain why the cases dis-
cussed in Part III give directors such broad discretion as to the
temporal element of their fiduciary duties.
That is not to turn a blind eye to the fact that the market for cor-
porate control plays a large role in the problem of short-termism
that I have identified. But it is rather to acknowledge that different
264. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).
265. This would also be true with respect to the corporation's dissolution.
266. This would generally include mergers, asset sales, exchange offers, and tender of-
fers, where shareholders would receive cash or other property in consideration for their
equity interests, resulting either in a significant change in the capital structure of the corpo-
ration or in the disappearance of the corporation. See Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit
Maximization, and the "Responsible" Shareholder, 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 31, 35-36 (2005)
(identifying as the paradigmatic situations in which stockholders' and other constituencies'
interests diverge as the hostile takeover context and financial distress); Lawrence E.
Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70
TEx. L. REv. 579, 605-06 (1992) (describing transactions involving substantial distributions
of wealth to stockholders as one class of transaction in which conflicts between stockholders
and non-stockholder constituents most commonly arise).
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aspects of the short-termism problem may require different fixes,
and that my proposed fix addressed one source (though not the
only source) of the short-termism problem. It also has the added
benefit of approaching the short-termism problem in an incre-
mental way, with the goal both of increasing the chances of
adoption as well as providing an opportunity to reflect on the im-
pact of the proposal without too many major shifts in the law at
once.67 Thus again, my proposal might complement other legal
changes that would implement a policy promoting sustainable
wealth-creation.
Perhaps the best way to see how my recommendation would be
implemented is by example. Let us suppose that the business plan
(determined by management subject to board oversight) of a wid-
get manufacturing corporation called Widget Co., with operations
in the western United States, includes expanding its operations
into the Midwest in the subsequent five year period. Let us also
suppose that an activist investor of Widget Co., Active Investor,
sends a demand letter to the board of Widget Co. demanding the
sale of dormant manufacturing assets and the distribution of the
proceeds from that sale to shareholders. Under existing law, Wid-
get Co.'s board could make the decision to comply with Activist
Investor's demands simply on the basis that it would benefit inves-
tors in the short-term. In fact the board might follow this course of
action to avoid seeming uncooperative with Activist Investor.
Moreover, officers might support (and push for) this sale if their
compensation was tied in any way to profits generated by this
transaction. However, suppose that the assets requested to be sold
would be perfect for Widget Co.'s expansion into the Midwest, and
that buying equivalent assets in the future would be very costly.
Thus perhaps the board's decision to sell them would not be in the
best interest of Widget Co. and its stockholders, at least in the long-
term. Under my proposal, to comply with its fiduciary duties, the
board would need to determine whether selling those assets would
lead to enhanced profitability in the long-term (as compared to
not selling those assets and retaining them for future use). To do
that, the board would need to look at Widget Co.'s business plan as
well as at how selling the assets would impact that business plan in
the future. If, after this analysis, the board decided that Widget
267. Though arguably all of the new executive compensation rules might impair our
ability to assess and measure independently the impact of this proposal on the problem of
short-termism.
268. Obviously the board, in making this determination, would need to consider the
likelihood of the expansion actually occurring and of cheaper, equivalent (or better) assets
becoming available in the future, among other things.
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Co's business plan and long-term profit-making strategy would be
more effectively implemented by selling off the assets and buying
different assets in the Midwest, and that Widget Co. did not need
those proceeds for other projected expenditures under the busi-
ness plan, then it should proceed with the course of action
requested by Activist Investor. If, however, the board decided that
Widget Co.'s business plan and long-term profit-making strategy
would be more effectively implemented by keeping the dormant
assets until they were needed for the expansion, then it should
proceed in that fashion. In either case, under my proposal, the
board would need to consider Widget Co.'s long-term business
plan and how each course of action would have implemented that
plan and Widget Co.'s ability to generate profits over time to com-
ply with its fiduciary duties.
My proposal is similar to one component of a proposal made by
Professor John Matheson and Brent Olson over 15 years ago.26 9
However, the goal of Matheson's and Olson's proposal appears to
have been to provide long-term shareholders with the incentive
and ability to monitor the board with respect to conflict-of-interest
and fundamental transactions. 270 According to Matheson and Ol-
son, by giving institutional investors-seen as the quintessential
long-term shareholder-a more meaningful voice in governance,
those investors will have a greater incentive to view their holding as
long-term, as they will no longer feel locked out of the governance
process.71 My proposal also seeks to focus directors on the long-
term. However, my proposal places the impetus on the board, as
the fulcrum of the corporate business lever, to reflect the long-
term interests of stockholders and the corporation. The board is
already obligated to act as a fiduciary to all stockholders-thus in
my view it makes sense to charge them with implementing the
long-term corporate agenda that is developed under their over-
sight rather than individual investors who generally do not owe
one another fiduciary duties and who may have divergent interests.
Moreover, my proposal attempts to give effect to the long-standing
formulation of directors' fiduciary duties as being owed both to the
corporation as well as its stockholders, while also implementing the
policy of creating long-term profitability for the benefit of our
economy and society. Recent developments pertaining to executive
269. SeeJohn H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder
Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1313, 1376-77 (1992) (proposing that the
corporate purpose be to advance the interest of the corporation and its long-term share-
holders).
270. See id. at 1315, 1376-81.
271. Id. at 1322.
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compensation practices as well as investor activism would also seem
to make my proposal propitious.
B. Responses to Anticipated Critique
Let me address a number of criticisms that I anticipate will be
made to my proposal.
First, opponents will undoubtedly argue that my proposal re-
moves from stockholders an ability to influence certain board
decisions that they favor. The proposal would in fact do that, for it
would strip from the board the discretion to make decisions that
are primarily aimed at generating short-term profits, including
where that is due to a request from a stockholder. That, in turn,
would mean that some stockholders would effectively have less
power to influence the board. But that is one of the primary pur-
poses of the proposal-to remove from directors the discretion to
manage for the short-term, whether that be due to stockholder in-
fluence, officer influence or other reasons. Moreover, the proposal
would give some stockholders-particularly long-term stockhold-
ers, more power, for it would give them a more clearly defined
standard to which to hold director conduct.
This leads to the second potential challenge-that this proposal
could cause an increase in suits against boards. While it is possible
that shareholders will commence more suits against directors to
enforce this more clearly defined standard, directors would still be
protected from needless suits under the business judgment rule.272
Moreover, the other procedural protections that shield directors
from needless fiduciary duty suits-such as the requirement that
stockholders first make demand on the board unless demand
would be excused as being futile2 7' and that stockholder plaintiffs
state their claims with particularity274 -would continue to apply.
Thus directors would realistically only face liability for failing to
meet this new aspect of fiduciary duties where they consciously dis-
regarded their charge of advancing long-term profitability, which
would amount to bad faith and thus a breach of the duty of loyalty.
Yet it is precisely in those circumstances where the board should
face liability, for if a board is not considering how a non-takeover
272. See supra note 181 and accompanying text for a discussion of the business judg-
ment rule.
273. See DEL. CH. Cr. R. 23.1 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?id=39138; Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814-15 (Del. 1984).
274. SeeDEL. CH. CT. R 23.1.
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decision will allow a corporation to implement its strategy in the
long-term, the board should be held accountable for that failure.
A third potential criticism is that by requiring directors to con-
sider the interests of non-shareholders in making business
decisions, directors may act contrary to the interests of sharehold-
ers. This is one of the primary concerns raised by shareholder
primacists, who believe that the corporation should be managed
solely for the benefit of shareholders. However, as I showed in Part
IV, long-term profitability is in the interest of both shareholders
and the corporation's other stakeholders. Thus directors would not
be acting to shareholders' detriment by focusing on long-term
profitability. Moreover, directors would continue to have the dis-
cretion to decide, as between the different corporate constituents,
how to allocate those profits.
Fourth, critics might argue that stockholders can simply defeat
the long-term mandate under my proposal by replacing the board
with directors who are sympathetic to their short-term demands.
While shareholders would have the same right to remove and elect
directors under my proposal that they currently have, they would
not be able to elect directors simply as a means of obtaining favor-
able short-term action, for every director would be obligated to
manage the corporation for the purpose of long-term profitability.
While it is true that new directors might persuade management to
change the corporate strategy to one that involves removal of cer-
tain business lines (thus leading to, for example, the sale of assets
and distribution of cash to investors), even in those contexts the
board's decisions would need to be part of a larger, coherent busi-
ness strategy aimed at creating long-term wealth rather than being
the result of an investor or officer push for short-term returns.
Fifth, one might question whether implementing this proposal
would lead managers to decide to reincorporate in other jurisdic-
tions as a way to avoid its application.275 This argument would
generally track the "race to the bottom" line of reasoning in that
corporations would be expected to incorporate or reincorporate in
jurisdictions with more lenient corporate governance standards.76
However, as many commentators have noted, there is no longer a
race among states for incorporations, as Delaware has clearly won
275. Generally reincorporating in a different jurisdiction requires approval by the
board and stockholders. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 390(b) (2001); see also Roberta
Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 843, 849 (1993) (noting that reincorporating requires approval of stockholders).
276. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L T. 663, 663-68 (1974) (arguing that states' reliance on incorporation fees leads them to
adopt laws that are favorable to managers over shareholders).
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that race. 77 And in fact many commentators believe that there is
not a race to the bottom at all, but rather a "race to the top" such
that states with the most value-maximizing systems of corporate
governance are more likely to attract incorporations. Under that
line of thinking, Delaware, if it implemented my proposal, might
attract more incorporations (or at least would not be at risk of los-
ing them), for as I argue above, it would cause directors to make
decisions that are more reflective of a firm's "true value" than does
existing law. Moreover, if Delaware courts would implement my
proposal, I would expect that other states would follow suit, as they
often look to Delaware law for guidance in developing their corpo-
rate laws.279 That, in turn, would reduce or eliminate the prospect
of reincorporating outside of Delaware simply to avoid application
of my proposal.
Sixth, critics might challenge whether this proposal would in
fact change the substance of any board decision, as directors could
always find a way to rationalize how any decision would benefit the
corporation and stockholders in the long-term. But one of the
benefits of this proposal is that it will force the board, under its
duty of care, to become informed in a way that allows it to deter-
mine whether a given action will in fact produce long-term profits.
Failing to become informed in this way could amount to a con-
scious disregard of duty and, again, an act in bad faith. Even
ignoring the prospect of liability, most directors will undoubtedly
opt to become informed about whether their decisions truly ad-
vance the goal of long-term profitability once they understand that
this is their required objective. Thus even if the substance of board
decisions remains difficult to regulate under the reformulated
duty, the processes that must be undertaken for the board to de-
cide whether an action meets the reformulated duty should afford
much protection to long-term stockholders and other constituents.
Moreover, even ignoring the potential for liability, the proposal
277. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55
STAN. L. REV. 679, 724 (2002) (noting that no state competes with Delaware for corporate
charters); MarkJ. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv. 588, 590 (2003).
278. See Romano, supra note 275, at 848-49 (arguing that the race to the top theory is
supported by event studies); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 255--56 (1977) (arguing that firms that oper-
ate under a legal regime that does not maximize firm value would be outperformed by firms
operating under a legal regime that did, and would therefore have lower stock prices, which
would lead to the ouster of those managers or a takeover coupled with reincorporation in a
regime that would maximize value). But see Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor
State Competition in Corporate Law, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1775 (2002) (challenging the findings of
these event studies).
279. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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would serve an expressive purpose, instructing directors how they
should perform their duties.
Finally, critics will argue that the proposal ignores the problem
of short-termism caused by the market for corporate control. Nu-
merous academics have identified the takeover market as one of
the primary reasons why directors manage for the short-term.2"0 But
it does not seem to be appropriate to adopt a one-size-fits-all solu-
tion to the short-term problem, particularly as takeover decisions
involve a challenge to a corporation's long-term business objectives
that are not present for non-takeover decisions. Yet there are many
pressures on boards to be short-termists outside of the takeover
context that should be addressed, particularly given the rise of the
hedge fund and investor activism. That fact, however, should not
mean that we only approach the problem through a single, com-
prehensive fix. In fact, as I argue above, there are many reasons to
adopt an incremental approach to the short-termism problem.
CONCLUSION
While directors are not required under their fiduciary duties to
make decisions that yield short-term profits, the pressures on them
to do just that are substantial and real. They are increasingly being
pressured by individual shareholders, who claim to simply be seek-
ing value for all shareholders, to make decisions that do in fact
deliver value to shareholders-but only in the short-term. They are
also influenced by the short-term agendas of executives, who re-
ceive lavish bonuses upon the generation of short-term profits. The
effect of many of these decisions has been to cut off a firm's source
of long-term cash flows and to ignore long-term risks. The current
economic crisis reveals not only the devastating impact on specific
businesses of this excessive focus on the short-term, but also the
disastrous impact on the entire U.S. economy and citizenry of this
short-termism plague. While no single measure can be expected to
fix the short-termism problem, we certainly should not sit idly by
while companies continue to collapse, employees continue to lose
jobs, and investors continue to lose their investments due to prior
short-sighted decisions. As the new administration starts to con-
sider how to fix the problem of short-termism, so, too, should the
Delaware courts, which enforce directors' oversight and manage-
ment responsibilities. They should, in my view, lead the charge, not
by implementing a sweeping reform, but by simply eliminating
280. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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unnecessary discretion as to the time period over which corpora-
tions should seek to achieve profitability.
